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ABSTRACT
Extant literature has yet to fully examine the
antecedents to, and performance implications of,
horizontal expansion strategies.

Defined as strategies

that increase a firm's domain within an industry, these
business level strategies constitute an important
component of a firm's overall scope.

This study takes a

complementary view of two theories of the firm--resource
theory and governance theory--in order to explain
horizontal strategy and performance.

An empirical

investigation of 101 restaurant chains shows that firms
respond to governance cost pressures when choosing among
alternative horizontal strategies, except when
strategically valuable resource stocks are low.

However,

no clear link was found between this strategic behavior
and performance.

The interaction between resources and

governance furnishes a stronger explanation of horizontal
strategic choice than previous research grounded in either
theory alone.

Furthermore, one-way relationships

identified by prior research may need to be re-evaluated.

ix

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Resource theory (cf. Wernerfelt, 1984) and governance
theory {cf. Williamson, 1985) are two important theories
for understanding organizations (e.g., Anderson &
Coughlan, 1987; Barney, 1988; Carney & Gedajlovic, 1992;
Conner, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Harrigan,
1988a, Teece, 1980).

According to resource theory,

managers choose among alternative strategies based on the
need to build strategically valuable resource stocks
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989).

strategy, therefore, enables the

firm to acquire and/or protect the unique and valuable
resources needed to compete effectively in new markets
(e.g., Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984).

According to

governance theory, managers respond to governance costs
(Mahoney, 1992) when selecting among alternative
strategies.

Specifically, firms are thought to seek

strategies that minimize the costs of negotiating and
enforcing (i.e., governing) transactions across markets
vis-a-vis internal hierarchies (Williamson, 1975; 1985) .
Also, the costs of monitoring and bonding agents (e.g.,
managers or cooperative partners), often across
geographically dispersed operations, gives rise to agency
costs (another form of governance costs) which the firm
will wish to minimize in strategic decisions (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976).

Thus, strategies are chosen such that

transaction and agency governance costs are minimized.
1

2
Although these two theories are usually viewed as
independent or competing (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 1992;
Conner, 1991), the central assertion of this study is that
they are better viewed as complementary.

That is, firms

are expected to respond to the "fit" between resource
stocks and governance costs in their particular context
(Venkatraman, 1989).

Specifically, firms are postulated

to pay primary attention to governance costs when choosing
among alternative strategies--except when important
resource stocks are low.

When firms suffer from resource

shortages, they should respond with strategies designed to
fill resource gaps.

Additionally, when firms respond in

accordance with these theoretical arguments, they should
perform better than firms that do not because they will be
responding effectively to cost pressures (i.e., governance
costs) and competitive needs (i.e., resource stocks).
This synthesis of resource and governance theory is
tested in the context of horizontal scope.

Although

extensive literatures investigate strategies for expanding
vertical and industry (i.e., diversification) dimensions
of scope, strategic management researchers have not yet
tested a general model of horizontal (i.e., business
level) scope.

Horizontal scope can be defined as the

domain or breadth of organizational activities within a
single industry setting.

Thus, horizontal expansion

strategies are business level strategies that increase the
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geographic or market segment scope of a firm's operations.
In light of calls for firms to return to their "knitting"
(Peters & Waterman, 1962), refocus on "core competencies"
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), or constrain themselves within a
"dominant logic" (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), a study
focused on horizontal expansion at the business level
seems timely.
Although the literature on horizontal expansion is
fairly fragmented, five major strategies for horizontal
expansion have been identified.

These are; (1) internal

development, (2) horizontal acquisition/merger, (3) equity
joint venture (EJV), (4) management contract, and (5)
franchising.

With respect to these, two general research

questions are relevant.

First, what are the factors that

influence managers to select particular horizontal
expansion strategies?

The answer to this question will

help practitioners better understand the competitive
pressures acting upon them and enhance their ability to
predict competitors' strategy.

Second, given the field of

strategic management's concern with performance (e.g.,
Hrebiniak, Joyce, & Snow; 1989; Meyer, 1991), do strategic
choices among alternative horizontal strategies impact
performance?

These questions furnish the driving force

behind this study.
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Statement of the Problem

The need to Investigate a synthesis of resource and
governance theories in the context of horizontal expansion
is derived from three sources.

First, the two theories

examined in this study have sometimes been viewed as
competing explanations of similar phenomena {e.g., Carney
& Gedajlovic, 1991; Conner, 1991).

Multiple and competing

theories, such as these, must be compared and/or
integrated if the discipline of strategic management is to
continue to develop (cf. Kuhn, 1962).

Although there have

been some initial attempts to integrate governance and
resource theories, these efforts have been, to date,
incomplete (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs &
Castrogiovanni, 1994; Castrogiovanni, Bennett, & Combs,
1995).

Hence, there is a need to better understand the

relationship, if any, between these two theories
(Bacharach, 1989).
Second, although the concepts of scope and business
level strategy are central to strategic management (Hofer
& Schendel, 1978; Schendel & Hofer, 1979), little is known
about the antecedents to strategy in the context of
horizontal expansion.

Indeed, few studies directly

address issues of geographic or market segment scope
(i.e., horizontal scope).

There is a large body of

research to help marketers identify market segments (Beane
& Ennis, 1987; Biggadike, 1981), and Abell (1980)
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translated some of this literature into terms strategic
managers could use to define their business domain.
However, these studies do not shed light on why or how
firms alter their horizontal scope.
Finally, despite the importance of explaining
performance, most horizontal scope literature only
attempts to explain strategy, ignoring how these choices
might affect the firm's performance.

Several studies

explore the performance implication of a single horizontal
expansion strategy (e.g., Lubatkin, 1987; Koh &
Venkatraman, 1991), and a smaller group of studies (e.g.,
Anderson, 1984) investigates the performance implications
of a dichotomous choice between two strategies.

However,

these studies fail to simultaneously compare the
performance implications of additional horizontal strategy
options.

This is problematic because extant research does

not reflect the variety and complexity of horizontal
strategy alternatives actually confronting managers.
Hence, there is a need to investigate the performance
implications of the full range of horizontal strategy
choices.
Significance of the Study

The purpose of this study is to use resource and
governance theories to better understand the factors that
influence firms in their selection of horizontal expansion
strategies and to investigate the performance outcomes of

6
horizontal strategy.

As noted, most of the horizontal

scope literature currently centers on the antecedents to,
and performance outcomes of, only one or two alternative
horizontal expansion strategies.

By building upon this

work, a model is set forth that combines resource and
governance explanations for horizontal strategy across a
broad range of strategy options.

Importantly, the model

also examines the effect of strategy on performance.
Through an empirical test of the model, three
contributions are present.
The study's first contribution is derived from its
integration of resource and governance theories. Because
these theories offer conflicting explanations of the same
phenomena, there is a need to better understand the
conditions under which managers should respond to the
prescriptions of each theory.

The "fit" between resource

and governance described in this study begins to explain
these conditions.

Additionally, the interaction found

here between measures of resource stocks and governance
costs should encourage future researchers to design more
inclusive (i.e., both resource and governance) studies and
provide a caveat to the interpretation of prior research
that relied on a single theory (i.e., either resource or
governance).
The study's second contribution is to further our
understanding of the antecedents to horizontal strategy.
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Such understanding is important because it can help
managers make more accurate predictions of their
competitor's strategic behavior.

While prior research has

examined horizontal expansion strategies from a single
theoretical frame (e.g., Anderson & Coughlan, 1987;
Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988a), this study provides a
more powerful model than was previously available by
suggesting that horizontal strategy is better understood
by integrating resource and governance theories.
Finally, this study examines the relationship between
strategy and performance. Most strategic management
scholars agree that research in the field must ultimately
be able to inform practitioners and enhance organizational
effectiveness (Montgomery, Wernerfelt, & Balakrishnan,
1989; Summer, et al., 1990).

However, extant research on

horizontal strategy has focused little attention on
performance.

For example, investigations of horizontal

strategy from a governance perspective have concentrated
solely on predicting governance structures (e.g.,
Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988).

Superior

performance is implied for firms choosing low cost
governance, but the relationship has not been tested.
Likewise, a few studies have examined the relationship
between resource stocks and performance (e.g., Castanias &
Helfat, 1991; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991),
but the resource-strategy-performance link remains
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untested despite its deep roots in the literature (e.g.,
Andrews, 1965).
Summary of Remaining Chapters

This chapter set the stage for the remainder of the
dissertation by briefly outlining shortcomings in extant
literature and highlighting potential contributions from a
study of horizontal strategy, its antecedents, and
performance.

Specifically, this study attempts to

contribute by,- integrating resource and governance
theories, (2) enhancing understanding of the motivational
antecedents to horizontal expansion strategy choice, and
(3) linking strategy and its antecedents to performance in
the context of horizontal expansion strategies.

The

remainder of this dissertation outlines how these
contributions are to be achieved.
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) begins with a survey of
studies which examine the performance implications of
individual horizontal strategies.

The literature

surrounding each of the five horizontal strategies is
examined in order to demonstrate the applicability of
resource and governance theories across the full range of
horizontal expansion strategies.

Then, Chapter 3 (Model

Development and Hypotheses) develops a model and
hypotheses depicting horizontal strategy as a function of
the fit between resource stocks and governance costs.
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Performance is modeled as the fit between all three;
resource stocks, governance costs, and strategy.
Chapter 4 describes the sample, measures, data
sources, and statistical tests used to test the
hypotheses.

The results presented in Chapter 5 show a

clear effect on strategy from the interaction between
resource stocks and governance costs in sampled firms.
Firms with fewer strategically valuable resources were
using resource assuring cooperative strategies despite the
high costs of governing these arrangements.

However,

performance was not shown to be affected by the three-way
interaction between resource stocks, governance costs, and
strategy.
The final chapter (Chapter 6) begins by revisiting
the study's hypotheses and summarizing the results.

The

implications of significant and non-significant results
are described.
addressed.

The study's shortcomings are also

These limitations, along with the results,

point to useful avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
A focal contribution of this study, noted in Chapter
1, is the examination of performance outcomes in the
context of horizontal expansion.

Because research in

strategic management is ultimately aimed at understanding
and improving organizational performance, the first
section of this chapter reviews the studies which have
examined the relationship between one or more of the
horizontal expansion strategies and performance. The
sparseness of these studies and the narrowness of their
focus highlights the need to simultaneously investigate
the entire array of horizontal strategies in order to make
more general statements regarding the relationship between
different strategies and performance.
The second section reviews five horizontal expansion
strategy alternatives; (1) internal development,

(2)

horizontal acquisition/merger, (3) equity joint venture,
(4) management contract, and (5) franchising.

The purpose

of this review is to bring to light the theories found in
extant horizontal scope literature.

The two most

prominent theories, resource and governance, are employed
in the next chapter to develop a model of horizontal
strategy and performance.
Horizontal Expansion and Performance
Studies investigating the relationship between an
individual horizontal expansion strategy and performance,
10
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can be found in the acquisition/merger, equity joint
venture (EJV), and franchising literatures.

Each is

reviewed below.
Merger and acquisition.

The central goal of the

merger and acquisition literature has been to understand
how acquisition benefits, if any, are distributed among
stockholders (Lubatkin, 1983).

Much of this research

emerges from finance using the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM).

It is an attempt to investigate the effects of

mergers and acquisitions on shareholder wealth (Lubatkin &
Shrieves, 1986).

Reviews of this literature generally

conclude that target firms' shareholders enjoy abnormal
returns (the difference between actual and expected stock
returns) while shareholders of acquiring firms do not
(Halpern, 1983; Jensen & Ruback, 1983).

Likewise, the few

studies that employ accounting measures of performance,
although plagued with methodological difficulties,
generally demonstrate limited significant performance
benefits for acquiring firms (Love & Scouller, 1990).
Similar results appear when divestment records are used as
a measure of acquisition success (e.g., Porter, 1987).
Hence, the empirical evidence in favor of merger and
acquisition strategies is less than compelling, especially
for acquiring firms.
In response, strategic management scholars have
employed the notion of ’'fit” as an explanation for the
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poor results emanating from studies using the CAPM.

They

suggest that sample aggregation may hide differences in
the organ!zationa1 or strategic fit between combined firms
{Lubatkin, 1983; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988).

Proper

"fit" then, may give rise to performance rewards for
acquiring firms.

Studies of organizational fit generally

confirm improved performance from combining firms that
share a dominant logic (i.e., similar competitive,
structural, and technological characteristics--Prahalad &
Bettis, 1986).

Surveys collected by Datta (1991) showed

that similarity of management styles can moderate the
performance of acquisitions.

Similarly, Chatterjee,

Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Heber (1992) found evidence that
cultural fit also moderates stock performance for
acquiring firms.

Likewise, the studies of strategic fit

have found performance differences between acquisition
types.

Specifically, horizontal and unrelated mergers

have, for different reasons, been related to above normal
stock returns (Chatterjee, 1990; Lubatkin, 1987; Kitching,
1967).

However, like the finance literature, the

strategic fit studies find that profits generally go to
the target firm's shareholders (e.g., Lubatkin, 1987;
Shelton, 1908; Singh & Montgomery, 1987).

Taken as a

whole, this research suggests that horizontal acquisitions
may have better performance implications than other types
of acquisitions.

Considering the complexity of the
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acquisition process (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986}, in addition
to the problems of merging cultures and organizational
systems (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh. 1988), horizontal
acquisitions furnish most of the sought-after advantages
of acquisitions (cf. Goold & Luchs, 1993), but at lower
integration costs stemming from greater isomorphism
between the merging firms (cf. Jones & Hill, 1988).
Several implications can be drawn from this stream of
research for the present study.

First, as a stand alone

strategy, acquisitions have not been shown to produce
significant, above normal returns for acquiring
businesses.

However, while these studies only explore

short-term stock performance, any real benefits from
acquisition strategies are most likely long-term in
nature.

Further, successful acquisitions often involve

synergistic resource combinations that cannot be detected
by market observers (Barney, 1988) . Second, results
improve when merging firms share the same dominant logic.
Hence, there is reason to believe that horizontal
acquisitions, which should involve similar ways of
conducting business, perform better than other types of
acquisitions (Chatterjee, 1986).

Finally, no studies to

date examine the performance outcomes of acquisition
relative to other means of horizontal expansion.
Eouitv joint venture. Joint ventures are
organizations, called the "child," created and owned by
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two separate organizations, or "parents" (e.g., Harrigan,
1968b). Equity joint ventures (EJVs) involve a sharing of
equity, usually equal, among the parents.

Although they

are usually viewed as the most complex and interdependent
form of cooperation between otherwise independent firms
(Contractor & Lorange, 1988), the weight of evidence shows
that their use is increasing dramatically (Hergert &
Morris, 1988).

The studies that have looked at EJV

performance have viewed it as a function of (l) industry
structure,

(2) EJV strategy, or (3) control.

First,

depending on industry structure, joint venture's vary
significantly in duration (sometimes used as a proxy for
performance). Embryonic industries are often
characterized by a "spider's web" of different forms of
cooperative arrangements that service temporary strategic
needs, capitalize on narrow windows of opportunity, and
reduce investment risk in the face of significant
uncertainty (Harrigan, 1988a). In contrast, declining
industries often use more long-term EJVs to retire excess
capacity and reduce competitive rivalry (Harrigan, 1988b).
Recent scholars have, however, questioned the use of
stability and longevity as an indicator of EJV success
(Hamel, 1991).
Others view EJV stability and success in relation to
the strategic purposes for which an EJV was initiated.
Koh and Venkatraman (1991) examined the strategy-
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performance link among 175 joint ventures in the
information technology sector.

They found greater stock

returns resulted from EJVs active in the parents' existing
product and/or market segments.

These results suggest

that when EJVs are formed to combine resources
synergistically, investors expect superior performance
(e.g., Woolridge & Snow, 1990).
Finally, some observers see control as the central
feature in EJV success.

In an international context,

Geringer & Herbert (1989) posit joint venture performance
as a function of the fit between parents' international
strategy, EJV strategy, and control.

They explicitly look

at three dimensions of control. Mechanisms for control
include majority ownership, veto rights, supplying general
management, and organizational routines and procedures
(Behrman, 1970; stopford & Hells, 1972).

Because

transaction costs can be minimized (Anderson & Gatignon,
1986), some evidence suggests that superior EJV
performance results when one partner dominates, or
maintains the full extent of control (Killing, 1983).
Finally they argue that control can be centered or focused
on a narrow band of organizational activities.

Given

international strategy and context, these three control
dimensions should be configured to maintain sufficient
control over key inputs while minimizing monitoring,
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negotiating, and bonding costs between parents
(Williamson, 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976}.
Although elements of industry structure, EJV
strategy, and control have been shown to impact the
performance of EJVs, prior research provides no evidence
suggesting the context in which they should be used
instead of alternative strategies.

The fact that EJVs are

increasingly popular indicates that they must have some
perceived advantages over other strategies.

These

advantages are, however, yet to be investigated.
Franchising. This "hybrid" form of organization can
be defined as a continuing relationship in which the owner
of a service or trademark grants exclusive rights to a
franchisee for local distribution in exchange for certain
fees, royalties, and compliance to service standards
(Justis & Judd, 1989} .

In addition, the franchisor

(service owner} usually provides business training and
advice.

In the literature on franchising, only Anderson

(1964) tests the performance outcomes of franchising.

He

was, however, unable to demonstrate any definitive
performance effects.

Unfortunately, his unit of analysis

was the industry and his measure of performance, sales per
establishment, fails to account for variance in cost
structure.

Hence, it is impossible to draw conclusions

that would be useful to firms who must choose among
alternative growth strategies.
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In aggregate, studies that examine the relationship
between a horizontal strategy and performance suffer from
several deficiencies.

First, the acquisition and EJV

studies are troublesome because their samples mix several
forms of diversification with horizontal expansion.

For

example, Lubatkin (1987) studies concentric, conglomerate,
and vertical acquisitions in addition to horizontal.

It

is therefore difficult to isolate the performance
implications of the horizontal component of strategy.
Second, extant work does not explore performance
implications across the full range of horizontal strategy
options.

The literature may tell us that EJVs can be

effective in a particular context, but it sheds little
light on its effectiveness relative to other options.
Finally, with the exception of qualitative evaluations of
EJV success, most of these studies are unable to find any
support for positive performance effects when a strategy
is investigated in isolation.

Therefore, a comparison of

the antecedents of alternative strategies and their
performance implications may help alleviate this problem
(Williamson, 1991).
Strategies for Horizontal Expansion

In order to establish a framework in which to compare
horizontal strategies and their performance outcomes, the
five strategies for horizontal expansion are reviewed
below.

Special care is taken to identify the theoretical

is
rationale observers have used to explain why, and under
what conditions, managers select each of the strategies.
These theoretical perspectives are summarized in Table 21.

As shown in the table, only governance and resource

approaches to explaining horizontal strategy span the
whole range of strategic options.

These theories can

therefore provide the foundation of a model explaining
strategy and performance.
Internal development.

Firms that grow through

internal development use internally generated funds and
debt to build and manage new operations (Sasser, Olsen, &
Wyckoff, 1978).

This strategy provides the most control

of any horizontal strategy over expanding operations, but
at the expense of growth, which is restricted by current
earnings and debt capacity (Ansoff, 1965; Martin & Justis,
1993).

Currently, not much literature relates directly to

internal development.

Much of what does exist resides in

the context of internal resource allocation processes.
Bower's (1970) study of internal allocation processes
describes how lower level resource shortages often dictate
strategic behavior in large diversified firms.

Also,

Burgleman (1983; 1984) shows how internal venturing finds
space in corporate strategy.
Recent work using a resource based theory of
organization (e.g., Conner, 1991) may help explain when
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Table 2-1: Theories of horizontal expansion strategies
STRATEGY

RESEARCH

THEORY

EXAMPLES

Internal
development

Bower, 1970;
Burgleman, 1983; 1984.
Wernerfelt, 1984;
Dierickx & Cool, 1989.
Chatterjee, 1990;
Yip, 1982.

Horizontal
acquisition
and/or merger

Equity joint
venture (EJV)

proseae:-:-

Resource

3t:ra:tR9:
i<;:::::::

Williamson, 1991;
Eisenhardt, 1989a.

caverhihce::

Baker, Miller, &
Ramsperger, 1981; Walter
& Barney, 1990.

EOOhbrttitori;:o f ;:

Stigler, 1964.

Marketpower

Prahalad & Hamel, 1990;
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986.

■Reridiirca

Hamel, 1991.

Respurqa;

scale yk';scope;

Harrigan, 1988a.
choice;
Hennart, 1988.

Governance

Management
contract

Anderson & Gatignon,
1986.

Governance:

Franchising

Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969;
Hunt, 1973.

Rps

Rubin, 1978.

Governance
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internal development may be an appropriate strategy.
According to this theory, only firms possessing
strategically valuable resources (those that are important
in competition and difficult to imitate--Lippman & Rumelt,
1962) can create a sustainable competitive advantage (SCA)
(Barney, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982).

Often the

characteristics of resources that can support a SCA (e.g.,
Barney, 1991) are such that they require long-term
investments (Barney, 1986).

These resources (e.g.,

trademarks, business systems, reputation, and employment
practices) can often be shared and strategically combined
via cooperative strategies (e.g., Harrigan, 1988a), but
they are difficult to purchase without paying a premium
(Barney, 1968).

Internal development also furnishes a

mechanism by which these resources can be protected once
built (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) .
Research comparing internal development to
acquisitions in the context of diversification entry
strategy also sheds light on why internal development may
be selected.

Yip (1982) examined 59 market entries and

found some evidence that internal diversification was
associated with strategic relatedness and low entry
barriers.

Chatterjee (1990) explored 144 diversification

moves at 47 Fortune 500 firms and found that internal
diversification is preferred over acquisition when
internal funds are widely available and the expansion is
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highly related to existing businesses.

Taken together,

these studies indicate internal development is favored
among resource abundant firms when market entry is highly
related, as it often is with horizontal expansion.
Governance costs provide another explanation for the
choice of internal development.

Due to potential shirking

(i.e., opportunism) and high coordination costs,
transaction cost logic states that firms choose to
internalize those activities which are costly to perform
through intermediaries (Williamson, 1975).

Likewise,

agency theory specifies internal development when the
costs of monitoring managers' behavior within the
hierarchy can be done at lower costs than through
cooperative alternatives (Eisenhardt, 1989a).
In summary, although internal development can be
viewed as a response to internal strategic processes
(e.g., Bower, 1970; Burgleman, 1983; 1984), it can be more
appropriately described as a strategy to create and
protect resource stocks.

Resources that must be built

over a long time period can be protected through the high
level of control inherent in internal development
(Chatterjee, 1990; Dierickx & Cool, 1989).

In addition,

internal development appears to be a tool to minimize
governance costs (Table 2-1) . Therefore, we would expect
internal development to be used predominately in
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situations where firms have the financial resources to
implement it, and where effective control is essential.
Horizontal accruisition/merger. Evidence on why firms
choose acquisition as a strategy to expand horizontally
comes first from studies that asked managers directly why
they employ acquisitions.

Baker, et al. (1981) identified

fifteen separate motives for acquisitions.

Their analysis

of differences in motives between managers involved with
different acquisition types found that horizontal mergers
were motivated more by the desire to obtain economies of
scale, increased market share, and expansion of geographic
scope than were other types of acquisitions.

Similarly,

Walter and Barney (1990) identified twenty motives for
acquisitions.

Their analysis of merger and acquisition

specialists' opinions of manager motives showed horizontal
acquisitions to be motivated by the desire to enter new
businesses, improve economies of scale and scope, increase
product lines, and to manage critical dependencies.

Taken

together, these studies suggest that increased economies
of scale and scope (i.e., economic efficiency) is a
central explanation for why managers engage in horizontal
acquisitions and mergers.
Certainly, one of the more conventional explanations
for horizontal acquisitions is to increase market power
(Jensen & Ruback, 1983).

As the number of firms in the

industry decrease through horizontal acquisition, tacit
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collusion by the remaining firms is thought to become
increasingly feasible (Stigler, 1964).

However, if market

power was driving horizontal acquisitions then rival
firm's performance would be expected to improve on the
news that they could collude more easily and this does not
appear to be the case (Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983).
Hence, other forces besides market power appear to be
driving horizontal acquisitions.
From the research on the acquisition-performance
relationship reviewed previously, another reason firms
employ horizontal acquisitions is evident.

Several of the

studies suggested that acquisitions are a superior
strategy when resources are combined in ways that build
upon a dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).

Some

research shows these advantages are most likely available
in horizontal acquisition, suggesting that another
potential motive for horizontal acquisition is to build
strategically valuable resource stocks by combining
compatible resources (Barney, 1988; Chatterjee, 1986) .
In summary, the most clear motives for horizontal
acquisitions are increased economies of scale and scope,
increased market power, and resource accumulation (Table
2-1).

It should be noted, however, that these are highly

related motives.

Often, it is valuable and unique

resource combinations that lead to economies of scope and
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market power, and hence, to a sustainable competitive
advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1969).
Eoultv joint venture. Kogut (1988) identifies three
central motives for joint venture formation; (1) learning,
(2) improving strategic position, and (3) minimizing
transaction costs.

Organizational learning is clearly a

primary goal for many EJV parents who enter a joint
venture for the expressed purpose of learning an important
skill from a partner, especially in technologically
complex industries (Killing, 1983).

Stated differently,

when firms' lack critical resources (such as skills),
joint ventures enable them to tap into another's resource
base to perform market functions that could not be
achieved independently (Hamel, 1991).
Joint ventures are also used to enhance a firm's
competitive position vis-a-vis competitors.

Previous

research offers several important competitive and
strategic uses for EJVs.

For example, they can be used to

influence an industry's competitive structure by
increasing concentration levels, controlling unpredictable
competitors, or by increasing the speed of industry
evolution (Harrigan, 1988a). Not only can EJVs be
employed to increase market power and erect entry
barriers, they can also be used to by-pass such barriers
(Vickers, 1985).

Additionally, EJVs can be used to gain a

25
"toe-hold" in strategically important markets, or to
capture first mover advantages (Harrigan, 1986a).
The third explanation of EJV formation is provided by
transaction costs.

Hennart (1988) argues that

organizational learning and strategic positioning are
necessary but not sufficient conditions to explain why
firms choose EJVs over other strategic options.

In the

transaction cost logic of institutional economics, EJVs
represent a hybrid form of organization (Williamson,
1985).

Firms would rather invest equity in an operation

in order to have direct control as well as to avoid costly
negotiations and inefficient monitoring of cooperative
partners (Williamson, 1975).

Indeed, several studies

associate EJVs with these incentives (Hennart, 1988;
Kogut, 1988).

Although transaction cost economics can

explain why firms want some form of equity arrangement
over arms-length negotiations, in order to explain EJV
formation it must also explain why firms do not choose
complete ownership (Hennart, 1988).

Hence, from a

transaction costs (or more generally, governance )
perspective, firms that choose an EJV, must also face
significant costs, risks, or structural impediments to
deter the firm from complete internalization (Buckley &
Casson, 1988; Hennart, 1988).
In sum, EJVs come about as a result of a myriad
factors (Table 2-1) . First, they can be used to combine
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complementary skills (resources) in order to Increase
organizational learning and build resource stocks.
Second, they appear to be tools for strategic positioning.
For instance, they can be used to enhance market power or
to maneuver around entry barriers.

Finally, they can be

used to create a hybrid form of organization that balances
the costs of governance and the advantages of direct
control.
Management contract. These represent contractual
arrangements where a firm takes an active role in the
management of facilities owned by another organization.
Often these operations are housed within a larger
institutional environment (e.g., fast food restaurants on
college campuses).

In theory, they have been placed on a

continuum of control (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986) or of
interorganizational dependence (Contractor & Lorange,
1988) between equity joint ventures and franchising.
Relative to EJVs there is a loss of control because the
host organization can cancel the contract if disagreements
arise in the relationship (cf. Harrigan, 1988b).
Similarly, without shared equity to bind cooperating
firms, participants in management contracts can experience
increased interorganizational dependence.

Although it has

not been empirically validated, the logic of management
contracts as a choice along a control or dependence
continuum is consistent with the logic of efficiency in

27
governance (Williamson, 1991) . Hence, the only extant
explanation for management contracts views them as a
mechanism for balancing governance costs with control
needs (Table 2-1),

However, the nature of this balance

remains unspecified.
Franchising.

In terms of horizontal scope,

franchising permits expansion to a critical mass by
accessing financial and local management resources (Caves
& Murphy, 1976; Oxenfeldt fit Kelly, 1969).

However costs

associated with franchising include the risk of free
riding behavior by franchisees, under-investment in system
development by local entrepreneurs, and expensive contract
negotiations (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs &
Castrogiovanni, 1994}.

Nevertheless, franchising is used

in a plethora of industries and it has spawned significant
research interest.

As detailed below, much of this work

centers on the question of why firms choose a particular
mix of franchised and internally developed outlets.
Scholars have usually adopted either a resource or
governance position when investigating this question.
Resource arguments are based on a life-cycle logic
(e.g., Levitt, 1965) which suggests that young firms
lacking the necessary financial and managerial resources
to obtain economies of scale engage in franchising as a
mechanism to acquire these scarce resources.

As a firm

matures, it builds slack resources and competencies which
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permit it to reduce its dependency on franchising and fund
future growth through internal development (Carney &
Gedajlovic, 1991; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969).
Several empirical studies provide support for
resource theory.

At the industry level, some evidence

shows falling rates of franchising as the firms in an
industry mature (Caves & Murphy, 1976; Hunt, 1973).

At

the firm level, older and larger franchisors have been
found to shift their system composition away from
franchising as resources accumulate in maturity (Combs &
Castrogiovanni, 1994; Hunt, 1973).

Moreover, increased

franchising has been linked with periods of economic
recession when credit (i.e., a key financial resource) is
tighter (Martin & Justis, 1993).
The second viewpoint on franchising builds on agency
theory as articulated by Jensen & Meckling (1976) .

It

states that franchising facilitates growth by allowing
firms to expand into regions that would be costly to
manage with internal company managers.

More important

than growth per se. however, is the cost reducing function
that franchising in certain locations can provide for the
franchisor.

Hence, there is an assumed need for economic

efficiency in the control function (Carney fit Gedajlovic,
1991).

According to the agency perspective, franchisors

are believed to balance the costs associated with
monitoring internal company managers against franchising's
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liabilities (i.e., free riding behavior, negotiation
costs, and risks of franchisee under-investment).
There is substantial evidence to support an agency
theory explanation of franchisor behavior.

Geographic

dispersion, which increases the costs of monitoring
company managers, is associated with increased franchising
(Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Norton, 1988b). Also,
locations close to headquarters (i.e., low costs of
monitoring company managers) and those with low repeat
business (i.e., high risk of franchisee free riding
because customer dissatisfaction manifests elsewhere in
the firm's system) tend to be company owned (Brickley &
Dark, 1987) . Finally, Caves and Murphy (1976), and others
(Brickley, Dark, & Weisbach, 1991; Norton, 1988b) found
higher use of company ownership in transient industries
where free riding behavior would be expected (because the
customer is not coming back to that outlet).
Together, theories suggest that franchising has two
central motivations (Table 2-1).

First, it can be a

mechanism for growth, furnishing scarce financial and
managerial resources when they are insufficient.

Second,

it can be used in combination with internal development to
strike an optimally efficient monitoring cost (i.e.,
governance) configurat ion.
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Summary

This chapter began by reviewing studies that
investigate the relationship between individual horizontal
strategies and performance.

In general, these studies

fail to; (1) separate diversification strategies from
horizontal strategies, (2) compare performance effects of
alternative horizontal strategies, and (3) identify
significant stand alone performance effects among the
horizontal strategies studied.

The second section

reviewed the five horizontal strategies: (1) internal
development, (2) horizontal acquisition,
management contract, and (5) franchising.

(3) EJV, (4)
The review

pointed to two dominant theoretical perspectives, resource
and governance, which can together be used to explain all
five horizontal strategies.

In the next chapter, these

theories are combined in order to provide an explanation
for horizontal strategy across the entire range of
alternatives.

CHAPTER 3: MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES

The last chapter identified two theories that have
been central to explaining how managers are influenced to
select among alternative horizonal strategies.

The

sporadic nature of testing for performance implications
across these strategies was also noted.

In this chapter,

these two theories, resource and governance, are
integrated into a model suggesting that the "fit” between
resource stocks and governance costs will influence
strategy.

It is then posited that when managers choose

strategy commensurate with theoretical predictions,
superior performance should follow.
In the first section of this chapter, the two
theoretical explanations of horizontal strategy are
outlined.

Next, the horizontal strategies reviewed in

Chapter 2 are placed conceptually on a continuum in order
to facilitate the integration of resource and governance
theories across the five strategies.

In the third

section, a model is presented depicting the fit between
governance costs and resource stocks as influencing
strategy along the continuum, and the fit between
governance costs, resource stocks, and strategy as
affecting financial performance.
Theories of Horizontal Expansion Strategy

Prom the review of horizontal strategy summarized in
Table 2-1, two general theories for explaining horizontal
31
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strategy choice are apparent--(1) resource and (2)
governance.

Because they have been used independently

across all of the horizontal expansion strategies, they
provide the groundwork for an integrated theory of
horizontal strategy and performance.

These theories are,

therefore, briefly outlined below.
Resource.

In his seminal work that laid the

foundation for business-level strategic analysis, Andrews
(1965) painted a fairly balanced picture of how both
internal and external factors contribute to successful
strategies.

However, only in the last decade have

researchers re-examined the role of heterogeneous
distributions of resources in shaping strategy and
performance.

Resource based theory of strategy emphasizes

how managers act to acquire resources that will build a
sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) for the firm
(Conner, 1991).

Much of the research using this approach

attempts to describe the characteristics of resources that
will, over time, build a SCA.

Barney (1991) asserted that

resources must be: (1) strategically valuable such that
they are necessary to implement strategy, (2) rare enough
that not many competitors can possess them, (3)
imperfectly imitable, meaning others cannot create the
resource without significantly higher costs, and (4) nonaubatl tutable (i.e., other resources cannot produce the

same benefits). Others have articulated similar lists of
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resource characteristics (e.g., Grant, 1991).

Some of the

specific resources that have been named as potential
providers of a SCA include management teamwork (Castanias
& Helfat, 1991; Hambrick, 1987), culture (Barney, 1986),
brand name capital (Aaker, 1991), and internal development
processes (Burgleman, 1983).
Also central to a resource based theory is the notion
that some firms are able to control strategically valuable
resources that other firms cannot or will not duplicate
(Barney, 1991).

Historical investment patterns and

significant environmental shiftb have been named as the
two primary factors giving rise to resource based
advantages.

For example, a steady pattern of investment

over time can build resources such as brand name
reputation, employee commitment, or effective top
management team interaction (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).
Significant environmental disruptions (i.e., technological
shifts) can leave a previously dominant firm struggling
with competitors who were fortunate enough to possess
matching resources (e.g., the "correct" technology)
(Barney, 1986; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982).

Even capital

resources, which are often thought to flow efficiently
between organizations, can be difficult for otherwise
successful firms to obtain (Martin & Justis, 1993) .
Hence, to maximize chances for success in the market,
firms should identify what types of resources are
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necessary to compete in their industry, employ strategies
designed to build resource stocks as quickly as possible,
and protect those resource stocks once they are built.
Governance. Transaction cost economics and agency
theory constitute the two major, and highly related,
governance theories of firm behavior.

Transaction costs

theory asserts that firms choose strategy and structure so
that organizational activities are performed in the least
cost environment--hierarchy or market (i.e., whether to
internalize a function or contract for it with an external
actor)

(Williamson, 1975).

Transaction cost economics can

trace its roots to Coase (1937).

By recognizing the costs

inherent in using markets to perform transactions, Coase
hypothesized that firms will grow until the marginal costs
of organizing equals the marginal costs of contracting in
markets.

Borrowing heavily from Coase, Williamson (1975)

extended the framework and articulated market and
transaction specific variables which may influence firms'
choice between hierarchy and market.

As two firms become

interdependent with one another (i.e., through
contracting), each increases its exposure to potential
opportunistic (i.e., shirking) behavior on the part of the
other firm.

Risk of opportunism then, becomes an

incentive for each firm to internalize the activities
previously performed by the other (Williamson, 1975) .
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The second governance theory, agency, is focused on
the relationship between principal(s) and their agent(s)—
to whom some decision making authority is delegated
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

Agency

theory was developed independently of transaction costs by
economists in the 1960s and 1970s who were concerned with
how groups could be efficiently monitored given group
members' incentive to shirk (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz,
1972).

Because principals and agents are assumed to have

divergent self-interests, the central premise of agency
theory states that they will minimize; (1) the principal's
costs of monitoring the agent's actions, (2) any costs
paid by the agent to ensure the principal's interests
(i.e., bonding costs), and (3) any residual loss due to
remaining divergence between their respective goals
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Although the two theories do not share the same
academic legacy, they are remarkably similar as depicted
in Table 3-1.

Both theories possess an efficiency

orientation that offers guidance for selecting between
alternative governance arrangements.

Moreover, they share

many of the same assumptions and their lists of governance
costs overlap (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Mahoney, 1992) .
One important difference is that they employ
different independent variables (i.e., measures of
governance costs; Eisenhardt, 1989a). However, Mahoney
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Table 3-1: Transaction costs and agency theories1
DIMENSION

Central
hypothesis

"Hierarchies roughly correspond to
behavior-based contraLets, and markets
correspond to outcome!-based contracts"
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, r). 64)

Focus

Organizational
boundary

Principal-agent
relationship

Unit of
analysis

Transaction

Contract

Dependent
variable

Organizational
governance

Agent governance

Independent
variables

Asset specificity

Risk propensities

Uncertainty

Uncertainty

Complexity

Task
programmability

Transaction
frequency

Information
asymmetry

Number of
buyers/sellers
Assumptions

Self interest

Self interest

Goal conflict

Goal conflict

Bounded rationality

Bounded rationality

Information
asymmetry

Information
asymmetry

Efficiency motive

Efficiency motive
Risk aversion
{table con'd)
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Central
governance
costs

ex ante;

Info, search
Negotiation

ex Dost:
Monitoring
Bonding
Adaptation Loss

ex post:
Monitoring
Bonding
Adaptat ion loss
Adaptation costs
1 This Table draws heavily from Eisenhardt (1989a),
Mahoney (1992), and Williamson (1975; 1985).

38
(1992) points out that by including both ex ante
information search and negotiation costs, as well as ex
post monitoring, bonding, and adaptation costs,
transaction costs simply encompasses a broader array of
governance costs into its framework than does agency.
Hence, agency costs can be viewed as a sub-set of
transaction costs.

A second salient difference is found

in their respective focus.

Because transaction costs are

found on the organization's boundary, it tends to explore
questions such as: Can this type of business use joint
ventures (e.g., Hennart, 1988)?

Agency, on the other

hand, highlights internal relationships.

Hence, it asks

questions such as: Given that franchising is appropriate
for our business, in what locations should it be used
(e.g., Lafontaine, 1992)?

The distinction is important

because it explains why most horizontal strategy
literature centers on transaction costs while the
franchising literature employs an agency framework.
Although there are still some meaningful theoretical
differences between transaction and agency approaches to
governance, for three reasons this study focuses on their
common governance costs explanation for strategy.
they share the same basic central hypothesis.

First,

Namely,

hierarchies can furnish better control over behavior,
while markets can provide stronger incentives to
organizational actors and greater strategic flexibility
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(Eisenhardt, 1989a). Second, both perspectives are used
in extant horizontal strategy literature (Table 2-1).
Perhaps more importantly, both are necessary to fully
explain strategy across the whole range of horizontal
alternatives.

Finally, there has been a subtle shift in

the literature toward an overall emphasis on governance
(e.g., Hennart & Park, 1994; Mahoney, 1992).
In summary, resource and governance theories are
independent theories which specify alternative
explanations of strategy.

Resource theory views strategy

as the way a firm builds and manages its base of valuable
resources.

Conversely, governance theory depicts strategy

as a way to minimize the costs of doing business.

In

order to combine these theories in the context of
horizontal scope, the next section places the strategies
for horizontal expansion on a continuum and relates the
continuum to resource and governance.
A Continuum of Horizontal Strategy

The five horizontal strategies reviewed in the last
chapter can be placed on a continuum as shown in Table 32.

The shaded top box displays the five horizontal

expansion strategies to be investigated.

The next five

boxes indicate the underlying dimensions, and breadth, of
strategy continua used elsewhere.

In strategies toward

the left, firms act more unilaterally, thus they are
labeled independent strategies while strategies to the
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Table 3-2: A continuum of horizontal expansion strategies

k*1::

BJV

■MCx-i-x-Fnu*:-

i*.*i WV jJ-.-S ^rVAA

VV

High control
[------------ (Anderson & Gatignon, 1966)

High Interorganizational
dependence

VV

JI*
Low control
1

Low interorganizational
dependence

[--(Contractor & Lorange, 1986}-]
Hierarchies

Hybrids
Markets
(Williamson, 1991)-----------------]

[■
High foreign
Low foreign
resource
resource
involvement
involvement
[---------(Erramilli fc Rao, 1990)---------- ]_____

Differences in purpose, boundary, value creation, &
stability
(Borys & Jemison, 1989)
[■

]

1 Borys and Jemison's (1989) framework employs the
broadest definition of hybrid organizational forms. Hence,
it is the only one that explicitly includes acquisition.
2 The abbreviations are: l) ID-internal development, 2)
HA-horizontal acquisition, 3) EJV-equity joint venture, 4)
MC-management contract, and 5) Fran.-Franchising.
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right are called cooperative strategies (Contractor &
Lorange, 1988).
As the Table (3-2) shows, this ordering of strategy
is consistent with extant literature.

Furthermore, it

reflects both resource and governance theories.

Resource

theory posits that firms engage in strategies to build and
protect strategically valuable resources (Conner, 1991).
Although independent strategies such as internal
development and horizontal acquisition can certainly build
resources, they do so as a higher cost than cooperative
strategies (Harrigan, 1988a). Resources must be purchased
at, or above, market prices in the case of horizontal
acquisitions (Barney, 1988) and managers who choose
internal development face greater capital constraints
(Martin & Justis, 1993).

Moreover, firms using internal

development often experience increased market exposure
because it forces managers to emphasize some resources
over others before their future value is known (Barney,
1986).

Nevertheless, independent strategies can protect

valuable resources by giving the firm full hierarchical
control (Geringer & Herbert, 1989).

Conversely,

cooperative strategies (i.e., EJVs, management contracts,
and franchising) furnish increased opportunities to build
on the resources of other firms (Erramilli & Rao, 1990).
This, however, is at the expense of increasing levels of
interorganizational dependence (Contractor & Lorange,
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1988).

Further, cooperative strategies furnish fewer

effective mechanisms to maintain control over these
resources {Geringer & Herbert, 1989).
Governance theories also posit stronger control over
organizational activities in independent strategies
because of the direct control mechanisms built into
hierarchies (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Williamson, 1991) .
Internal development is placed somewhat higher on the
continuum because it renders greater control than
horizontal acquisitions due to the complexity inherent in
merging firms (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Shrivastava, 1986).
However, the benefits of control must be balanced against
the bureaucratic costs that can breed inefficiency and
inflexibility under these strategies (Jones & Hill, 1988;
Merton, 1945).

Moving toward cooperative strategies,

strategic flexibility will often increase, but at the cost
of fewer effective control mechanisms (Anderson, &
Gatignon, 1986; Borys & Jemison, 1989; Williamson, 1991).
Hence, the continuum presented in Table 3-2 is meaningful
for both resource and governance theories of strategy and
it is consistent with extant literature.
A Model of Horizontal Expansion Strategy

Although other theoretical perspectives have been
employed in horizontal expansion studies, resource and
governance were shown to be useful theories across all of
the identified strategies.

Moreover, resource and
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governance have been presented as competing explanations
of horizontal strategy.

A central thesis of this

dissertation is that our understanding of horizontal
strategy and its relationship to performance can be better
understood through an integrated model of horizontal
strategy (cf. Combs & Castrogiovanni( 1994).

Therefore, a

model is presented in Figure 3-1 where strategy is seen as
being influenced by the fit between resource stocks and
governance costs.

If firms make choices that "fit" the

theoretical logic, they should perform better in
subsequent years than firms that fail to conform to the
model.
Hypotheses

Much of the logic for the model comes from the
resource scarcity thesis, which posits that when a
resource is central to competitive success in an industry
(see: De Vasconcellos & Hambrick, 1989), firms lacking
that resource will engage in strategies designed to obtain
it--even in the face of high governance costs (Carney &
Gedajlovic, 1991; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969).

Conversely,

when firms possess adequate resource stocks, their
strategic choices will reflect minimization of governance
costs (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986).

Hence, the nature of

the relationship between resource stocks and governance
costs is such that resource stocks moderate the governance
cost-strategy relationship (cf. Venkatraman, 1989).
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This logic requires that two relationships be specified.
First, high governance costs (i.e., high external agent
negotiation and monitoring costs) should lead to more
independent strategies (strategies to the left of the
continuum: Table 3-2) and low governance costs should
relate to cooperative strategies (on the right of the
continuum). This relationship is well established in the
governance literature (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Williamson,
1991).

Second, when resources are insufficient,

cooperative strategies, which furnish access to another
firm's resources, will be chosen regardless of governance
costs.

Hence, governance costs will only influence

strategy when resources are adequate.

Resource stocks are

expected to influence the relationship between governance
costs and strategy only when resource stocks are low.
Thus, it is expected that;
Hypothesis 1:

There will be a significant interaction
between resource stocks and governance
costs such that when resource stocks are
low, firms will select cooperative
strategies. When resource stocks are high,
firms will respond to governance costs such
that high governance costs will lead to
independent strategies and low governance
costs will lead to cooperative strategies.

This hypothesis is displayed visually in Figure 3-2
as a contrast between the shaded and unshaded cells.
The other interaction set forth in the model (Figure
3-1) is between resource stocks, governance costs,
strategy, and performance.

The expectation that resource
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Resource
stocks
Strategy

Performance

Governance
costs

Figure 3-1: An integrated model of horizontal strategy and
performance

Governance costs
Low

High
High
rbtegiea-:-:-:-:-:-:
Low

Cooperative
strategies

Cooperative
strategies
Cooperative
strategies

Figure 3-2: Hypothesized interaction between resource
stocks and governance costs: Effect on
strategy

stocks, governance costs, and strategy will impact
performance is based in part on the logic of efficiency
which underlies the transaction cost and agency approaches
to governance (Williamson, 1985).

Although it has never

been empirically validated, this literature assumes that
by responding to governance cost pressures, firms are
selecting low cost alternatives (Williamson, 1985).
Presumably, choosing the "correct" (i.e., low cost)
strategy translates into better performance.

Likewise,

resource theory views cooperative strategies as a resource
saving and resource combining strategy that can be used to
build competitive advantage and superior performance.
Therefore, for those firms that respond appropriately to
simultaneous pressures for efficiency and resource
accumulation, superior performance can be expected.
Stated as a formal prediction:
Hypothesis 2:

There will be a significant three way
interaction effect between resource stocks,
governance costs, and strategy such that;

(a) firms that choose cooperative strategies
when resource stocks are low regardless of
governance costs or when governance costs are
low regardless of resource stocks,
and;
(b) firms that choose independent strategies
only when resource stocks and governance costs
are high;
will perform better in subsequent time periods
than those that do not.
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Figure 3-3 visually displays this hypothesis such
that the shaded cells (representing firms expected to be
high performers) are contrasted with the unshaded
(expected low performers).
Sumnary

This chapter began by describing the two theoretical
explanations (resource and governance) of horizontal
strategy choice.

Then a continuum of horizontal

strategies was outlined to facilitate the development of
an integrative model of strategy and performance.

This

model, set out in the third section, shows resource stocks
and governance costs interacting to influence strategic
choice.

The fit between resource stocks, governance

costs, and strategy is then expected to affect
performance.

The final section articulated two hypotheses

depicting the specific nature of the expected "fit" or
interaction between resource stocks and governance costs
on strategy (Hypothesis 1}, and the impact of the
interaction between resource stocks, governance costs, and
strategy on performance (Hypothesis 2).
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Figure 3-3: Hypothesized interaction between governance
costs, resource stocks, and strategy: Effect
on performance

CHAPTER 4: METHOD

In this chapter, the procedures for testing the
hypotheses are set forth.

The sample and data sources are

discussed first, followed by a description of measures
used in the analysis.

Finally, the procedures used to

develop scales, establish reliability and validity, and
test the hypotheses are described.
Sample and Data Sources

Sample. Although environmental contingency factors
are beyond the scope of this study, they contribute to
variance in strategy (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990), and
must therefore be controlled.

One effective means of

controlling for such factors is to choose a sample from
within a single industry setting.

The food service

industry (denoted as standard industrial classification
[SIC] 5812 by the U.S. Department of Commerce) was
selected because; (l) this industry is one of the few that
uses all horizontal strategies, (2) there is a large
enough population of public firtnB from which to compose an
adequate sample, and (3) appropriate measures can be found
for all modeled constructs.
The years 1988 through 1993 were selected because
they are the most recent years in which data are
available.

1988 was chosen as the starting point because,

according to Standard and Poor's Industry Survey, it
marked a point of departure for several trends that have
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dramatically affected the industry's growth.

These

trends--(1) the increase of women in the work-force,

(2)

two income households, and (3) low birth rates--had fueled
7-15 percent industry growth since the early 1970s.

These

rates of growth leveled off in the late eighties as
competition from microwavable packaged foods and increased
birth rates (i.e., families staying home to eat) marked
slower industry growth.

These changes appear to have

forced the industry into a period of more moderate growth
with rates dropping from 7 percent in 1988 to 5.9 in 1989
and tapering off between 3.2 and 4.6 percent during the
remainder of the study period.

By beginning data

collection in 1988, the results are not greatly confounded
by any industry-wide structural shift.
Because this is a longitudinal study, the final
sample must contain firms that were publicly-held for at
least three consecutive years during this period (19881993) . Furthermore, firms that do not constitute a chain
(at least four outlets, see: Hawes & Crittenden, 1984),
franchisees (e.g., of franchisors such as McDonald's or
Wendy's), and firm's whose only food service is a
component of a larger operation (e.g., hotels and casinos)
were excluded.

According to Compact Disclosure, a

complete database of financial information for all public
companies, 98 firms meet this criteria.

Seven firms were

later excluded when no experts could be found to rate
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these firms during the expert panel phase of data
collection (discussed below).
Some of the food service companies in the sample
engaged in multi-chaining.
one chain of restaurants.

That is, they owned more than
For service businesses like

restaurants, developing a second or third chain cannot
simply be viewed as the addition of a new product.

Unlike

manufacturing operations, restaurants cannot decouple
production and distribution (Sasser, et al., 1978) and
therefore multiple chains cannot share most physical
resources.

Hence, multi-chaining is more analogous to

related diversification than to product development
(Carman & Langeard, 1980).

For this reason, Rumelt's

cutoff points of 95 percent of sales for single business
and 70 percent of sales for dominant business firms were
applied in the analysis.

If the firm obtained, on

average, less than five percent of its revenues from
secondary chains, these were excluded from all analyses.
Otherwise, multiple chains were treated separately for the
purposes of testing hypothesis 1.

This added ten chains

to the sample, bringing the total to 101 chains.
The performance measures needed to test hypothesis 2
had to be available at the chain level.

For several

reasons, this stipulation forced a reduction in sample
size for this hypothesis.

First, only firms with a

dominate chain (70% of corporate sales) could be included
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in the analysis for hypothesis 2.

Although chain-level

scores for some multi-chain firms (i.e., firms without a
dominant chain) could be averaged when their chains were
(1) in the same market segment (e.g., Popeye's fried
chicken and Church's fried chicken) and (2) within one
standard deviation of one another on all chain-level
measures used in the study, the remaining multi-chain
firms were dropped from the analysis.

Second, in some

years firms had to be dropped because they had not yet
gone public, or because they were taken off the stock
exchange due to bankruptcy, acquisition, or leveraged
buyout.

Finally, several firms were not traded publicly

and had to be dropped from the market return component of
the testing for hypothesis 2. The final sample sizes for
each year of analysis for each hypothesis is shown in
Table 4-1*.
Given an average sample size of 85.2 and the
estimated effect sizes reported in the next chapter (i.e.,
the 2-way interaction effect reported in Table 5-6), this
sample provided estimated power of beta - .94 to test
hypothesis l.

This level of power exceeds generally

accepted standards for power (i.e., beta * .8; Cohen,
1977) and surpasses power levels found in prior strategic
management research (i.e., beta - .59; Mazen, Hemmasi, &
*To preserve some lag between independent variables
and strategy, independent variables for 1993 data are not
included in the analysis.
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Lewis, 1987) . However, given the nature of hypothesis 2
(3-way interaction) and the reduced sample sizes for this
hypothesis, average power estimates are beta- .44 and .41
(based on the 3-way interact effects reported in Tables 514 and 5-15) for market and accounting returns
respectively (cf. Cohen, 1977).

Although these are not

desirable power levels, as shown in Chapter 5 (Figures 5-6
and 5-7), low power did not affect the study's findings.
Data sources. Most measures were obtained from
archival data sources.

Financial data was taken from the

Compact Disclosure database and most of the remaining
variables were coded from company annual reports, 10-Ks,
and proxy statements.

The advantages of these data

sources are that they are unobtrusive (Webb & Weick, 1979)
and provide objective measures validated in prior research
(e.g., Carney &. Gedajlovic, 1991; Lafontaine, 1992;
Rumelt, 1974).

In addition, three constructs for which

there are no quality archival measures available were
assessed through an expert panel survey of hospitality
management educators.

In similar research contexts,

expert opinions furnished by relevant academics have been
shown to be an effective and valid measure of subjective
constructs (Chen, Farh, & MacMillan, 1993).
Measures

In addition to the constructs defined in Chapter 3,
two control variables were necessary to properly test the
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model.

These are described first, followed by independent

and dependent measures.

Tables 4-2 through 4-5 and 4-7

list all of the variable names, their measures, and data
sources for each construct in the study.
Control variables. Several studies employ measures
of size and age to measure resource availability {e.g.,
Brickley & Dark, 1987; Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991) . Their
logic, centered in the life-cycle concept (e.g., Levitt,
1965), is that resources tend to grow as firms mature
(Combe & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969).
Since resource stocks are measured directly in this study,
the potentially confounding effects of the life-cycle
needed to be controlled.

Two frequently used measures

(Scott, 1987) were employed here to assess corporate size:
total sales and total assets. The number of outlets
comprising the firm's chain(s) was used as a measure of
size at the business level
1991; Lafontaine, 1992).

(e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic,

Age was measured as the number

of years since the firm began food service operations
(AGE). These are shown in Table 4-2.
Governance costs. Governance costs cannot be
measured directly because they are caused by many
different factors at multiple levels of the organization
making them difficult to isolate (Eisenhardt, 1989a;
Mahoney, 1992).

However, the organizational factors that

induce governance costs are readily observable (e.g.,
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Table 4-1: Sample sizes for hypothesis testing
Year of independent variables
1988
Hypothesis 1:

1989

1990

1991

1992

67

77

94

96

92

Market returns

36

45

48

55

68

Accounting returns

52

64

77

81

80

Hypothesis 2:

Table 4-2: Control variables--Constructs, measures, and
data sources
tJATASOtmClS
;Control::Variables:

SIZE

Total sales
Total assets
Total number of outlets

AGE

Years since food service
operations began_______

Annual reports
and 10-Ks
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Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1965).

Because the

hypotheses state that the amount of governance costs, not
the type of governance costs, will interact with resource
stocks to affect strategy and performance, the sum of
measures for three types of governance costs are employed
in this study.

These are summarized in Table 4-3.

Measures of geographic dispersion (DISPERSE) are
commonly used in the franchising literature as a proxy for
governance costs (e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987; Carney &
Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs a Castrogiovanni, 1994).

As firms

expand geographically, the governance costs associated
with monitoring outside agents decreases relative to the
cost of maintaining a hierarchical structure across
geographic regions.

Moreover, local preferences create

information asymmetries, which further decrease agent
governance costs (Rubin, 1978) . The number of states and
the number of foreign countries with outlets were used as
measures of geographic dispersion because of their common
use in the literature (e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987,
Lafontaine, 1992).
Task programmability (TP) is well established in the
agency literature as central to governance costs
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Mahoney, 1992).

It can be defined as

the "degree to which appropriate behavior by the agent can
be specified in advance" (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 62}.
programmability, reduces governance costs because it

Task
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allows agent behaviors to be more easily pre-specified.
In this study, we are primarily interested in the
programmability of the managers' job.

In general, simpler

operations such as "drive-thru-only" fast food restaurants
should be high on task programmability because day-to-day
operations can be easily specified in an operations
manual. This variable was assessed by expert panel
judgments of task programmability for each chain in the
sample.
Asset specificity (AS) is central to the transaction
cost conceptualization of governance (Williamson, 1975).
Asset specificity can be defined as the "degree to which
an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by
alternative users without sacrifice of productive value"
(Williamson, 1991, p. 281).

Asset specificity lowers the

governance coBts of using cooperative agents.

When

cooperative agents make investments in specific assets,
which cannot be used for other purposes, they have an
incentive to manage these assets in accordance with the
wishes of their partner (i.e., the principal), who has the
power to cancel the cooperative agreement, hence reducing
the value of specific investments.

This bonding

characteristic of specific assets is what reduces
governance costs (Klein & Murphy, 1986) . Asset
specificity was also assessed with the expert panel
survey.
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Resource stocks. The hypotheses state that the
amount. or total stock, of strategically valuable
resources will interact with governance costs to influence
strategy and performance.

However, there are several

types of strategically valuable resources that, in
combination, make-up firms' total resource stocks.

This

study employed measures for three types of resources
{financial, managerial, and brand name) previously
identified as strategically valuable to the food service
industry (e.g., Aaker, 1991; Justis & Judd, 1989;
Luxenberg, 1985).

These measures are shown in Table 4-4.

The first type of resource is financial.

To the

extent that capital markets are efficient, firms with the
greatest business opportunities should attract the most
capital and at favorable rates (cf. Fama, Fisher, Jensen,
& Roll, 1969}.

Thus, financial resources are seldom

considered valuable and rare in their capacity to support
a sustainable competitive advantage (Rubin, 1978) .
However, in the franchising literature, capital scarcity
has been named repeatedly by franchising practitioners as
a central reason for using this strategy (Justis & Judd,
1989; Luxenberg, 1985).

Indeed, empirical evidence

indicates that changes in the availability of funds in
capital markets influence strategic behavior (Martin &
Justis, 1993).

59
Table 4-3: Governance costs--Constructs, measures, and
data sources
.GGNSTKUCT.

d a t a :s o u r c e :

-Governance-,costs.
Geographic
dispersion
(DISPERSE)

Number of (U.S.) states
with outlets & the number
of countries with outlets

10-Ks and
Annual
reports

Task
programmabi1ity
(TP)

Scale measuring the
programmability of
management tasks

Expert
panel

Asset
specificity
(AS)

Scale measuring the
transferability of
physical and human assets

Expert
panel

Table 4-4

Resource stocks--Variable names, measures, and
data sources
i&lk
SOURCE
:Resource stocks

Financial
resources
(FIN)

Unabsorbed Slack: Cash and
marketable securities current liabilities / sales
Absorbed Slack: Working
capital / sales

10-Ks

Brand name
reputation
(BRAND)

Likert scale responses

Expert
panel

Top management
team experience
(TMT)

Executive food service
experience and tenure of top
managers on the board of
directors.

Proxy
stmts.
& 10-Ks
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Measures of financial resources (FIN) termed "slack"
have been proposed by Bourgeois (1981).

Conceptually,

measures of slack depict the amount (stock) of financial
resources which have been amassed over time for potential
immediate {unabsorbed slack) or relatively short-term
(absorbed slack) use (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Singh,
1986) . For this study, one measure of "unabsorbed" and
one measure of "absorbed" slack were used.

The construct

validity of each has been demonstrated in previous studies
(e.g., Chakravarthy 1986; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988).
Unabsorbed slack was measured by the extent to which cash
and marketable securities exceed current liabilities,
adjusted by sales (cash & marketable securities - current
liabilities / sales). This measure represents highly
liquid financial assets not yet subsumed into current
operations.

Absorbed slack is a financial resource that

is more difficult to convert into strategic investments,
but much of it can nevertheless be made available for
strategic investment through tighter capital utilization
practices (Singh, 1986).

It is measured as working

capital (current assets - current liabilities) as a
percent of sales.
Brand name reputation (BRAND) and top management
executive experience (TMT) are two other resources
frequently named as fundamental to success in food service
(Aaker, 1991; Luxenberg, 1985; Norton, 1988a). Because
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restaurants are an experiential good {Holmstrom, 1985;
Nayyar, 1993), customers often make first time purchase
decisions based on brand name reputations (Aaker, 1991).
Thus, the brand name reputation of a food service
operation is said to be central to its long term success
and growth (Luxenberg, 1985).

Because no "objective"

measure of brand name has been established in the
literature, it was measured through the expert panel.
Research has demonstrated the important role of top
management team personality and demographic
characteristics (e.g., Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Wiersema &
Bantel, 1992) for a number of strategic outcomes,
including performance (e.g., Murray, 1989).

Although no

consensus has been reached as to which executives to
include in the operationalization of top management team
characteristics, one popular approach has been to define
top management teams by including only inside directors
(i.e., top management team members with a seat on the
board of directors--e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).
This approach has the advantage of providing a clear
demarcation between top tier and second tier managers.
Furthermore, directorships indicate membership in the
dominant coalition (Thompson, 1967) and these managers
have been shown to possess greater organizational power
(Finkelstein, 1992).
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Since the objectives of this study were to measure
the total stock of top management team resources available
to the firm, it was measured by the number of years of
executive level food service experience and tenure held by
inside directors. Because the food service industry is
relatively stable, deep knowledge of successful
operational practices and the idiosyncratic
characteristics of a specific restaurant concept is
essential to good organizational performance (Luxenberg,
1965) . Thus, executive experience and tenure are
considered valuable assets because executives with deep
roots in the industry and firm are best suited to develop
and manage the tight operational procedures necessary to
build and maintain consistent service standards and cost
controls, which provide the foundation for long term
success.2
Strategy. The strategy measure must accomplish two
tasks.

First, it must capture the independentness or

cooperativeness of strategy as defined by the horizontal
strategy continuum (Table 3-2) . Second, it needs to
reflect the pattern of strategy that firms used in
response to resource and governance conditions during the
study period (Mintzberg, 1967) . Hence, as shown in Table
4-5, strategy was measured as the percent of growth

2The reverse is true in turbulent industry
environments (see: Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).
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accomplished through cooperative strategies (i.e., joint
ventures, management contracts, and franchising) during a
three year period.^
The measurement period was chosen for three reasons.
First, because many chains can implement horizontal
strategy decisions (i.e., build restaurants) in less than
a year (e.g., McDonald's can build a free-standing unit in
less than six weeks), the strategy measure begins in the
same year dependent variables (resource stocks and
governance costs) are measured.

Secondly, a three year

measurement period was selected because it is consistent
with strategic planning and implementation time-frames
discussed in many companies' annual reports or 10-Ks.
Moreover, this measurement period is long enough to
provide stability to the strategy measure.

If a shorter

period had been selected, the measure for smaller
companies' that grow by only one or two restaurants each
year would be biased in the direction of the strategy
selected for that year, irrespective of the firm's overall
strategic direction.

For example, Benihana's owned 20 of

their 23 restaurants (i.e., 67 percent of their
restaurants were maintained through independent
strategies) at the end of 1993 and their annual report
stated their intention to continue to focus on growth
^Because 1994 strategy data was not available, for
the 1992 independent variables (Model #5 in Table 4-6)
strategy was only measured with two years of data.
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through internal development.

However, two of their

cooperatively built restaurants were the only growth they
experienced during two of the study years (1989 and 1993) .
Therefore, with an annualized strategy measure, Benihana
would have skipped from highly independent to highly
cooperative, depending on the study year in question.
Finally, the three year measure is an improvement on
studies that have measured strategy as a percent of growth
over firms' life spans (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991;
Lafontaine, 1992)

because that measure confounds five,

ten, or even twenty year-old changes in strategic
direction by aggregating strategy over time (e.g., Combs &
Castrogiovanni, 1994).

For clarity, Table 4-6 shows the

measurement periods for strategy in relation to
independent variables.
Performance. The most complex concept in this study
is its ultimate criterion, performance.

A great deal has

been written about measuring organizational effectiveness
(e.g., Cameron, 1986; Cameron & Whetten, 1983;
Chakravarthy, 1986) and its central sub-set, financial
performance (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1966).

Much of this

literature focuses on the multi-dimensionality of the
performance concept.

Indeed, performance can be viewed as

containing multiple constructs within its conceptual
domain (cf. Bacharach, 1989).

The general consensus is

65

Table 4-5: Horizontal strategy--Variable name, measure and
data source

mm aoHRcn

m & m
Strategy
(STRAT)

Percent of cooperative
strategies used over three
years.

10-Ks and
Annual reports

Table 4-6: Time periods for strategy measurements
Model

1988

1)

Ind.1
(..... .Strategy....... )

2)
3)

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Ind.
(...... Strategy.....)
Ind.

4)
5)

1 Ind.-Independent variables.

Ind.
(.....Strategy..... }
Ind.
{..Strategy..)
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that multiple performance constructs should be examined
using multiple measures whenever possible to minimize
contamination and deficiency (Cameron, 1986; Venkatraman &
Ramanujam, 1986).
Accordingly, this study viewed performance from both
an efficiency and a market perspective.
are summarized in Table 4-7.

These measures

Accounting based measures,

such as return on investment (ROI), return on assets
(ROA), and return on sales (ROS) measure efficiency in
financial resource usage (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992).
Because line-of-business data in 10-Ks do not report
invested capital by line-of-business, ROS and ROA were
used as efficiency based measures of performance.

These

measures have been used often in strategic management
research (e.g., Dess & Davis, 1984; Hill et. al., 1992).
In contrast to the efficiency dimension, measures of
the market component of performance are "fully specified,"
meaning they reflect the judgements of many "experts" as
to the risk adjusted current and future earning potential
of each firm (Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986).

Based on prior

research in strategic management (Hitt & Ireland, 1985),
the Treynor Index (Treynor, 1965; 1968) was used as
follows:
MR - (MR-l - RFR)/fi
where;
MR

»

market return;
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Table 4-7: Performance variables--Constructs, variables,
measures, and data sources
1

a -i- ‘— '— ■— t-j— *— '— *- j- ■

tATASOflltCfc

CCwSTKtJCTa

Accounting
returns
(AR)

ROS (EBIT1 /
sales) and ROS
(EBIT / assets)

10-Ks

Market
returns
(MR)

Annual change in
the Treynor Index

Wall Street Journal,
Federal Reserve
Bulletin, and Value-Line
Investment Surveys

1 Earnings before interest and taxes.
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MR^ ■

the stock return for firm i adjusted for stock
splits, stock issues and dividends.

RFR -

the average risk-free rate based on monthly
average selling prices for the 3-month treasury
bill auction as reported in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin;

fi

-

beta, a measure of systematic risk as reported in
Standard & Poor's Company Profiles or calculated
using the same formula4 .

Because this measure captures performance at the
corporate level, following the standards set by Rumelt
(1974), only single and dominant chain firms (i.e., those
with over 70% of their revenues derived from a single
chain) could be included in this part of the analysis.
Since strategy is an independent variable for the
second hypothesis, the performance measures needed to
correspond appropriately with strategy's measurement
period.

Comments by CEOs in annual reports show clearly

that new outlets usually impact revenues immediately and
profits within a year after opening.

Therefore,

performance was averaged for the last two years of each
strategy measurement as shown in Table 4-8.
4Standard fc Poor's Company Profiles only reports
betas for firms that have been public for 60 months and
are listed on the American or NASDAQ stock exchanges.
Therefore, for remaining sample firms whose betas were not
reported, monthly returns were gathered for study months
in which the firm was public and betas were calculated
from this data.

€9
Data Coding and Scaling

The process of coding and calculating scales for this
study took place in three phases; (1) coding archival
variables, (2) conducting the expert panel survey, and (3)
calculating unit weighted scales.
Archival variables.

Because Compact Disclosure uses

a standardized format for reporting financial information,
the data necessary to calculate financial variables (i.e.,
total sales, total assets, ROS, ROA, absorbed slack, and
unabsorbed slack) were gathered from this database.

The

data for strategy (STRAT) and geographic dispersion
(DISPERSE) measures were coded by examining text and
tables in companies' annual reports or 10-Ks.

Years of

top management team tenure and executive level food
service experience (TMT) were coded from proxy statements
and 10-Ks.

Although companies reported this information

in a variety of formats, all information was reported.

As

others have found, the coding procedures were straight
forward due to the objective nature of the data (Michel &
Hambrlck, 1992).
Expert panel. Brand name reputation (BRAND), task
programmability (TP), and asset specificity (AS) were
assessed through an expert panel questionnaire (see: De
Vasconcellos & Hambrlck, 1989 for similar methodology).
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Table 4-8: Time periods for strategy measurements
Model

1988

1)

Ind.1
(.... .Strategy.....)
{. ..MR2 ___)
{...AR3 ....)

2)

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Ind.
{....Strategy. . ...)
(___MR. ...)
(....AR. ...)

3)

Ind.
(....Strategy. . ...)
(___MR. ...)
(... .AR. ...)

4)

Ind.
(___MR. ...)
{....AR....)

5)

1 Ind.-1ndependent variab1es .
2 MR-market returns.
3 AR-Average accounting returns.

Ind.
{..Strategy...)
(.MR.)
(.AR.)
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To develop the questionnaire, an initial pool of potential
questions were generated by three strategic management
researchers.

Content validity of the questions was

assessed through a retranslation exercise (Smith &
Kendall, 1963) in which ten additional strategic
management researchers were each given the questions on
separate slips of paper.

Using construct definitions

taken from the literature, they were then asked to group
the questions according to the appropriate construct.
Only questions that were categorized with 100% accuracy
were placed in a pilot questionnaire.
selected to measure each construct.

Pour questions were
It was felt that four

questions was enough to establish reliability while
keeping the questionnaire to a reasonable length
(Sheatsley, 19B3).
To pilot test the instrument, fifteen food service
executives and hospitality academics (from Cuco's Mexican
Restaurant, Smoothie King, the University of Nevada at Las
Vegas, and the University of Central Florida) were asked
to rate 40 chains on the 12 items (4 per construct) using
7 point Likert scales.

From their written comments and a

factor analysis of the results, one question was replaced
and several others were re-worded.

It also became

apparent that it would be too much to ask any one expert
rater to rate more than 10 firms.
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Next, 400 hospitality management educators teaching
at two and four year institutions were identified through
the Council for Hotel, Restaurant, and Institutional
Educators (CHRIE). Because each expert would only be
asked to rate 10 chains in the sample, the chains were
broken into ten groups according to the geographic
location of their headquarters.

These were then matched

with 40 hospitality experts who were located in the same
region of the country.
The surveys and associated materials (i.e., cover
letters and follow-up mailings) were constructed and
distributed in concordance with Dillman's (1978) total
design method.

Through a series of four dozen surveys,

Dillman and his associates developed specific,
empirically-supported recommendations designed to maximize
the response rate from potential informants.
The surveys were sent to potential expert panel
participants on February 6, 1995, followed by a reminder
post-card in one week.

A second survey was mailed two

weeks after the post-card and a third survey was sent in a
final follow-up four weeks later.

An example of one of

the regional surveys is found in the Appendix.
226 surveys were returned, yielding a response rate
of 55%.

However, 44 experts did not rate any of the

companies listed in their survey because their area of
expertise was in a narrow sub-field of hospitality (e.g.,
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hotel accounting, nutrition) and they did not feel
qualified to assess the chains.

This left a usable

response rate of 45.5%, which is significantly higher than
most research in strategic management (Snow & Thomas,
1994).

On average, the expert raters were knowledgeable

about 5.4 chains in their survey (they were asked to rate
only those chains for which they felt comfortable making
an expert judgement). As a result, seven chains were
rated by only one expert.

These ratings, however, were

very consistent with ratings for other chains in the same
market segment and, thus, were used in the analysis.

The

average number of ratings for a chain was 9.3 with a
standard deviation of 6.1.
Construct validity was assessed through factor
analysis of the total set of ratings produced by the
experts (n«983). The Harris-Kaiser oblique rotation was
used because, unlike orthogonal rotations, it does not
force factors to be uncorrelated.

To assume no

correlation between factors is usually a poor assumption
in social science research (Kerlinger, 1986) and if, by
chance, the factors were uncorrelated in this case, the
Harris-Kaiser rotation would still have produced
orthogonal factors.

Three factors were selected using the

eigenvalue greater than one criterion (Kerlinger, 1986).
As shown in Table 4-8, the factor loadings are very clean
and as expected.

Average loadings for variables on their
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Table 4-8: Expert panel rotated factor pattern
Item

BRAND

AS

TP

BN1
BN3
BN4
BN2
AS 2
AS1
AS 3
AS4
TP1
TP2
TP4
TPS

.93*
.90*
.78*
.76*
- .11
.07
- .10
.20
.02
.03
- .08
.07

- .12
.00
.04
.09
.83*
.73*
.70*
.61*
- .09
- .08
.09
.10

.03
.10
- .11
- .04
.02
- .12
.15
- .07
.91*
.86*
.85*
.84*

3.83

2.56

1.76

Eigenvalue
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theoretically correct factor was .81 while the average
loading on other factors was, in contrast, only .08.
Thus, the questionnaire shows strong evidence that it is
measuring three distinct constructs: (1) Brand name
reputation (BN), (2) asset specificity (AS), and (3) task
programmability (TP).
Two reliability coefficients were calculated to
establish the instrument's reliability.

Cronbach's alpha

is .87, .86, and .85, for brand name reputation (BRAND),
task programmability (TP), and asset specificity (AS)
respectably.

These reliability coefficients are above

traditional standards for basic research in the social
sciences (Nunnally, 1978).
reliability was .81.

Average inter-rater

Thus, the questionnaire appears to

exceed established reliability and validity standards
(e.g., Kerlinger, 1986; Nunnally, 1978).
Scales. The reliability and support for the validity
of measures for task programmability (TP), asset
specificity (AS), and brand name reputation (BRAND) were
demonstrated above.

Without any theoretical justification

for another weighing scheme, items that loaded on the same
factor were summed into unit weighted scales (Nunnally,
1978).
Zn addition to the expert panel scales, one dimension
of governance costs (geographic dispersion) and two
dimensions of resource stocks (financial and top
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management team) have multiple measures.

In order to

assess the construct validity of these measures, they were
entered into an obliquely rotated factor analysis for each
year of data (1988-92).

As shown in Table 4-9, these

measures loaded cleanly on independent factors as
expected.

The average loading for items on their

theoretically correct factor was .84 while the average
magnitude of loadings on other factors, in contrast, was
only .07.

Hence, these measures appear to tap into three

independent constructs.

These measures were then summed

to create a single variable for each construct (i.e.,
geographic dispersion, financial resources, and top
management team experience).
Since the hypotheses are based on the quantity of
resource stocks and governance costs, it was necessary to
standardize and then sum the scales for each dimension of
governance costs (DISPERSE+TP+AS-GOV) and resource stocks
(FIN+TMT+BRAND*RES). These unit weighted scales were the
independent measures used in hypothesis testing.
Univariate analysis of variable distributions showed
that the three size measures (total sales, total assets,
and number of outlets) were all non-normal.

In fact,

measures of organization size often have logarithmic
distributions (Scott, 1987) that must be transformed in
order to meet regression analysis' normality assumption
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992) . Although

Table 4-9: Factor structure for multi-measured independent
variables
1989
Countries
States
Unabsorbed slack
Absorbed alack
Executive experience
Executive tenure

DISPERSE
.83*
.74*
.07
- .05
-.19
.26

Eigenvalue

2.27

FIN
.11
- .12
.94*
.92*
.03
- .03
1.09

TMT
-.04
.01
- .03
.04
.83*
.73*
.96

1989
DISPERSE
Countries
States
Absorbed slack
Unabsorbed slack
Executive experience
Executive tenure
Eigenvalue

FIN

TMT

.80*
.77*
.00
- .01
- .19
.28

.00
- .01
.99*
.99*
-.02
.02

- .10
.05
- .00
.00
.80*
.68*

2.00

1.46

.93

193 Q
DISPERSE________ EIH__________ XMX
Countries
States
Executive experience
Executive tenure
Absorbed slack
Unabsorbed slack
Eigenvalue

.80*
.73*
- .18
.26
.05
-.05

- .11
.07
.83*
.69*
- .02
.02

1.94

1.51

.09
- .11
- .01
.03
.96*
.95*
.87
(table con'd)

78

1991

Executive experience
Executive tenure
Countries
States
Unabsorbed slack
Absorbed slack
Eigenvalue

TMT

DISPERSE

FIN

.88*
.73*
- .09
.04
.01
-.01

- .18
.27
.78*
.75*
- .04
.05

.03
- .04
.00
.01
.97*
.97*

1.96

1.63

.89

1992

Executive experience
Executive tenure
Countries
States
Absorbed slack
Unabsorbed slack
Eigenvalue

TMT

DISPERSE

FIN

.88*
.76*
-.09
.06
-.01
.02

- .17
.24
.79*
.75*
.01
- .00

.04
-.05
.03
- .02
.94*
.93*

1.80

1.68

.93

79
transformation affects the interpretation of a variable's
coefficient {Hair et al., 1992), the effect will not be
meaningful here because, as a control variable, size will
not be interpreted.

Hence, the three measures for size

were transformed by their natural log, standardized, and
summed into a single scale (SIZE).
One additional multi-measure construct had to be
summed into a unit weighted scale.

The efficiency

dimension of organization performance was composed of two
measures of accounting returns.

ROS and ROA were

therefore summed as a measure of efficiency (accounting
returns: AR).
Data Analysis
Statistical tests for the hypotheses must be capable
of detecting the presence of interactions.

The two-way

interaction and three-way interaction from Hypothesis 1
and 2 were pictured in Figures 3-2 and 3-3 respectively.
Moderated multiple regression {MMR) is generally
considered the most powerful technique for detecting an
interaction (Stone, 1988) and with two dependent measures
(Hypothesis 2), multivariate moderated multiple regression
(MMMR) is appropriate (Johnson & Wichern, 1988).

However,

as shown by Bobko (1986), in the case of a priori ordinal
interaction hypotheses like those postulated here,
traditional regression tests for interaction consumes
degrees of freedom and leads to unnecessary power loss
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when a simple t-test between group means (i.e., the shaded
versus non-shaded cells in Figures 2-2 and 3-3) is
appropriate.

Unfortunately, Bobko's example relies on

nominal data explored through sub-group analysis.

Because

this study employs interval scales, splitting the variable
distributions into groups would result in information
loss.

Hence, there is a dilemma because the literature

does not provide guidance for testing a priori ordinal
interaction hypotheses with interval data.
To resolve this issue, MMR (Hypothesis 1) and MMMR
(Hypothesis 2) were used as an initial test of the
hypothesized moderator effect.

Then, sub-group analysis

was performed by splitting the variable distributions at
their mean.
Hypothesis 1 was first tested using MMR, repeating
the following equation for each study year (1988-1992) :
STRAT - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES.
Because these analyses identified an interaction, it was
necessary to insure that its nature was consistent with
hypothesis l.

Therefore, firms were placed into two

groups (GROUP); (1) those with higher than average
resource stocks and higher than average governance costs
(independent strategists according to hypothesis 1) and
(2) those with other resource stock-governance cost
combinations (cooperative strategists according to
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hypothesis 1).

Hypothesis 1 was then re-tested using

ANCOVA with the following model:
STRAT - SIZE, AGE, GROUP.
In order to test the second hypothesis, all
remaining two-way interactions were added as control
variables into the following multivariate equation, which
was then tested for each study year (1988-1992) :
AR, MR - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES, STRAT*GOV,
STRAT*RES, STRAT*RES*GOV.
Unfortunately, as shown in Table 4-1, the multi
variate analysis for hypothesis 2 caused severe
attenuation of n-size due to missing market return (MR)
data.

Therefore, hypothesis 2 was also tested using

univariate MMR for each dependent variable:
AR - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES, STRAT*GOV,
STRAT*RES, STRAT*RES *GOV;
and
MR - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES, STRAT*GOV,
STRAT*RES, STRAT*RES*GOV.
As noted sub-group analysis is appropriate when an
ordinal interaction is specified a priori (Bobko, 1986) .
Therefore, firms were placed into groups (GROUP) as shown
in Figure 3-3 by dividing measures for resource stocks,
governance costs, and strategy at their mean.5

The

5This analysis was also performed with "high" and
■Ilow" groups defined by STRAT plus or minus one standard
deviation from its RES*GOV condition group mean. However,
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following MANCOVA model was tested for each year study
year.
MR, AR - SIZE, AGE, GROUP.

Sumuy
This chapter outlined the sample, measures, and
hypothesis tests used in this study.

The sample was

selected from all public companies who list SIC 5812 as
their primary or secondary code.

Next, multiple measures

for each construct in the study and their data sources
were described.

An attempt was made to validate these

measures based on an appeal to a priori theory, prior use
in the literature, and through empirical tools such as
factor analysis.

Where possible, reliability was

demonstrated through appropriate reliability coefficients.
Finally, procedures were then presented by which the
hypotheses were tested (moderated multiple regression
[MMR], analysis of covariance [ANCOVA], multivariate
moderated multiple regression [MMMR], and multivariate
analysis of covariance [MANCOVA]).

these results were the same as when all variables were
partitioned at the mean.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
Correlations between all independent and dependent
measures used to create composite scales for hypothesis
testing are shown in Tables 5-1 through 5-5.

Correlations

between all of the composite scales used in hypothesis
testing follow in Tables 5-6 through 5-10.6

The

remainder of the chapter reports the findings for
hypothesis 1 and 2.
Hypothesis l
The first hypothesis specifies an effect on strategy
from the ordinal interaction between the costs of
governing cooperative agents and the level of resource
stocks available to a chain.
Hypothesis 1:

Repeated formally:

There will be a significant interaction
between resource stocks and governance
costs such that when resource stocks are
low, firms will select cooperative
strategies. When resource Btocks are high,
firms will respond to governance costs such
that high governance costs will lead to
independent strategies and low governance
costs will lead to cooperative strategies.

Hypothesis 1 was tested first using MMR.

These

results are shown in Table 5-11 where a significant
interaction term {GOV*RES) indicates support for the
hypothesis.

Since the interaction between resource stocks

and governance costs is significant at p < .01 in one year
®The correlations between composite scales shown in
Tables 5-6 through 5-10 are created by summing standardized
measures. Therefore, means and standard deviations are not
reported because they are meaningless (i.e., have a mean of
0 and a standard deviation of 1).
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Table 5-1: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1968 (n-67)
MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

1)

TOTAL SALES1

902.604 2466.819

2)

TOTAL ASSETS

772.747 2294.616

.97**

3)

# OF OUTLETS

685.32

1784.10

.69**

4)

AGE

18.00

15 .86

- .09

-.08

.11

5)

UNABSORBED SLACK

- .09

.15

- .25

- .21

-.18

- .02

6)

ABSORBED SLACK

- .01

.16

- .14

- .12

- .16

-.09

7)

TMT EXPERIENCE

30.42

21.52

-.19

- .18

- .09

.39 *

8)

TMT TENURE

31.38

35 .41

.22

.27

.21*

.38

__*

6

7

_ _ **

.78

.88
.01
- .18

1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000).
(table con'd)

a>

MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10.77

3 .89

.11

.15

.12

-.06

.07

.04

.08

.16

10) ASSET SPEC.

15.06

4.00

- .01

.06

.16

.00

.08

.05

-.12

- .10

11) TASK PROGRAM

13.67

3.65

.07

.07

.12

.12

.05

- .04

.05

.09

12) # OP STATES

15.91

14.53

.52**

.54** .65**

.23*

- .39

-.32** - .05

.34

13) # OF COUNTRIES 4.13

9.94

.71**

.00**

.80**

.02

- .15

- .10

- .14

.21

9)

BRAND NAME

14) STRATEGY

.32

.36

.05

.08

.27

.01

-.05

-.15

.02

.09

15) RETURN/SALES

.04

.09

.09

.22*

.33

.05

- .12

- .16

.24*

.28

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.07

.13

.18

.15

.18

.17

- .12

- .18

.26*

.28

17) MARKET RETURN

- .56

4.37

.07

.05

.05

.15

-.13

- .03

.11

.10

(table con'd)

OB

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

BRAND NAME

9)

10) ASSET SPEC.

.01
.23*

12) # OP STATES

- .01

.03

.14
.61**

.17

.07

14) STRATEGY

.00

.20

.17

.29**

.16

15) RETURN/SALES

.26

.11

.15

.27

.25* - .05

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.27

.11

.16

.20

.15

- .12

.89

17) MARKET RETURN

.27

.24

- .03

.14

.04

.13

.04

*

H

13) # OF COUNTRIES

o

-.19

•

11) TASK PROGRAM

-.00

p < .05; ** p < .01

(9

Table 5-2: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1989 (n*77)
MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1)

TOTAL SALES1

956.749 2791.753

2}

TOTAL ASSETS

915.085 2932.124

.98

3)

# OP OUTLETS

640.96

1742.11

.70

.77

4)

AGE

19.00

15.86

- .09

-.10

.07

5)

UNABSORBED SLACK

- .10

.17

- .15

-.13

-.08

.18

6)

ABSORBED SLACK

- .03

.17

- .07

-.05

-.06

.16

.87

7)

TMT EXPERIENCE

32.25

21.44

- .18

-.18

-.07

.29

.03

8)

TMT TENURE

31.21

30.27

.29

_ . **

.25**

.29

7

.39** -.15

1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000)
(table con'd)

CO

MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

18.78

3.89

.11

.14

.13

-.06

.07

.07

.02

.06

10) ASSET SPEC.

15.06

4.00

.01

.03

.15

.00

.16

.12

- .14

-.05

11) TASK PROGRAM

13 .67

3 .65

.09

.09

.14

.12

- .03

- .00

.07

.13

12) # OF STATES

15.23

14.30

.52**

.50

.64**

.17

- .16

- .12

.01

.39

9.45

.73**

.78

.94**

.03

- .05

.00

- .08

.29

9)

BRAND NAME

13) tt OF COUNTRIES 3.5
14) STRATEGY

.33

.36

.03

.04

.24**

.12

- .14

- .11

.06

.17

15) RETURN/SALES

.03

.11

.15

.15

.20*

.13

- .22*

-.31**

.29

.29

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.04

.20

.13

.12

.13

.13

.01

-.15

.23

.25

17) MARKET RETURN

- .31

4 .29

.04

.03

.03

- .39

- .72

-.71**

.11

.09

(table con'd)

00

00

9
9)

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

BRAND NAME

10) ASSET SPEC.
11) TASK PROGRAM

.01
- .19

-.23*

12) # OF STATES

.02

.02

.16

13) # OF COUNTRIES

.12

.13

.09

.59**

- .05

.20

.14

.28**

.17

14) STRATEGY
15) RETURN/SALES

.24*

.00

.18

.25*

.16

.10

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.23*

.00

.19

.15

.12

.06

17) MARKET RETURN

.21

.19

- .05

.12

.03

.09

*

p<

.05; * * p <

.01

00

vo

Table 5-3: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1990 (n=94)
MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

1)

TOTAL SALES1

953.819 3060.615

2)

TOTAL ASSETS

851.181 3028.288

.98**

3)

# OF OUTLETS

630.82

1733.00

.71**

4)

AGE

20.00

15.85

- .06

- .06

.09

5)

UNABSORBED SLACK

- .10

.23

- .08

- .08

- .07

- .04

6)

ABSORBED SLACK

- .04

.20

- .03

- .03

- .02

- .02

7)

TMT EXPERIENCE

31.56

20.96

- .14

- .12

- .03

8)

TMT TENURE

30.52

30.13

.31**

6

7

.78

. „ **

.28

.31**

.32**

.91
.04

.42** - .02

1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000).
(table con'd)

MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

- .06

- .02

-.03

.14

.13

18.78

3.89

.11

.12

.13

10) ASSET SPEC.

15.06

4.00

.03

.06

.015

.00

.10

.18

- .14

- .04

11) TASK PROGRAM

13.67

3.65

.07

.08

.11

.12

.08

.04

.03

.09

12) # OF STATES

15.05

14 .05

.51**

.50**

.63**

.21*

-.24*

- .17

.09

.41

13) # OF COUNTRIES 3.59

9.55

.73**

.79**

.93**

.02

-.05

.01

-.05

.29

9)

BRAND NAME

14) STRATEGY

.34

.36

- .01

.00

.19*

.11

- .02

- .01

.04

.13

15) RETURN/SALES

.02

.20

.10

.10

.15

.13

-.29

-.33**

.20*

.21

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.04

.24

.15

.14

.17

.11

-.18

-.26**

.18

.19

17) MARKET RETURN

.86

3 .00

- .08

-.06

- .06

.14

.48** - .24

-.19

.43**

(table con'd)

9
9)

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

BRAND NAME
.01

10) ASSET SPEC.

- .19*

-.23*

12) # OP STATES

.01

.04

.18

13) # OF COUNTRIES

.10

.14

.09

.58**

-.17

.22

.13

.21*

.15

15) RETURN/SALES

.12

-.09

.10

.27*

.10

- .14

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.21

-.11

.16

.25**

.10

- .10

17) MARKET RETURN

- .04

- .06

- .17

- .04

- .19

11) TASK PROGRAM

14) STRATEGY

*

p<

. .

.05;

* *

p<

_„ *

- .19

.23

_ .

.01

M

Table 5-4: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1991 (n=96)
MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1)

TOTAL SALES1

99.954 3314.131

2)

TOTAL ASSETS

889.810 3259.896

.98**

3)

# OF OUTLETS

636.84

1794.91

.71**

4)

AGE

21.00

15.86

- .05

- .05

.10

5)

UNABSORBED SLACK

- .09

.20

- .03

- .03

- .02

.05

6)

ABSORBED SLACK

- .02

.19

.03

.03

.03

.06

.93

7)

TMT EXPERIENCE

33 .21

22.1

- .11

- .09

.02

.33**

.13

8)

TMT TENURE

31.8

29.63

.29

.28

.36**

.45**

.02

7

.79*

_ . **

1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000)
(table con'd)

VO

u>

MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

18.77

3.89

.10

.12

.12

-.06

.11

.11

.14

.13

10) ASSET SPEC.

15.06

4.00

.03

.05

.13

.00

.04

.15

- .13

-.04

11) TASK PROGRAM

13.67

3.65

.07

.08

.12

.12

.17

.17

.05

.12

12) # OF STATES

15.17

14 .20

.52**

.51**

.63**

.21*

.00

.06

.09

.43

13) # OF COUNTRIES 3.79

10.28

.74**

.80**

.94**

.03

- .02

.04

-.01

.33

9)

BRAND NAME

.32

.36

- .02

.00

.17

.14

.06

.06

.01

.12

- .01

.35

.06

.06

.10

.14

- .10

-.17

.14

.17

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.02

.33

.13

.12

.15

.14

- .01

-.09

.13

.21

17) MARKET RETURN

.77

3.32

- .07

- .05

- .06

- .05

- .10

-.06

-.03

- .14

14) STRATEGY
15) RETURN/SALES

(table con'd)

u>

9
9)

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

BRAND NAME

10) ASSET SPEC.

.01

11) TASK PROGRAM

-.19*

12) # OF STATES

.07

.00

.19

13) # OF COUNTRIES

.10

.13

.09

.58**

-.21*

.21*

.07

.16

.14

14) STRATEGY

- .23

15) RETURN/SALES

.07

- .09

.10

.21*

.00

- .20

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.12

- .06

.17

.26**

.13

- .22

17) MARKET RETURN

.10

- .07

.00

- .05

- .11

-.18

.01

* p < .05; ** p < .01
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Table 5-5: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1992 (n=92)
MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1)

TOTAL SALES1

1129.760 3794.282

2)

TOTAL ASSETS

989.794 3649.394

3)

# OF OUTLETS

669.69

1901.89

4)

AGE

22.00

15.86

- .06

- .06

.09

5)

UNABSORBED SLACK

- .06

.24

- .08

-.07

-.06

- .06

6)

ABSORBED SLACK

.04

.22

- .06

- .06

- .06

- .11

.87

7)

TMT EXPERIENCE

34.82

23.06

- .16

- .14

.00

.32

.09

8)

TMT TENURE

32.97

29.56

.32**

.45** -.02

7

.98**
.72**

.20*

.79

.20*

1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000).
(table con'd)
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MEAN

STD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

18.78

3.89

.10

.12

.13

- .06

.11

.00

.14

.14

10) ASSET SPEC.

15.06

4.00

.03

.06

.13

.00

.04

.07

- .06

-.04

11) TASK PROGRAM

13.67

3 .65

.07

.08

.11

.12

.13

.12

.03

.11

12) # OF STATES

15.64

14.29

.53**

.52**

.62**

.19

-. 07

- .09

.09

.42**

13) # OF COUNTRIES 4.08

11.01

.73**

.80**

.95**

.04

- .04

- .03

- .02

.29**

9)

BRAND NAME

.31

.37

.00

.01

.19*

.18

.04

.04

.10

.19*

15) RETURN/SALES

- .03

.36

.05

.05

.09

.16

- .01

- .04

.15

.21*

16) RETURN/ASSETS

- .02

.43

.10

.10

.11

.13

.05

.04

.11

.23*

17) MARKET RETURN

- .11

2.06

.01

.01

.01

.09

.09

.07

.08

.00

14) STRATEGY

(table con'd)

VO

-j

9
9)

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

BRAND NAME

1 0

) ASSET SPEC.

11

} TASK PROGRAM

-.19*

-.23*

12

} # OF STATES

.09

- .03

.19

.10

.13

.09

.58**

- .2 0 *

.19

.00

.2 0 *

.18

.12

.2 2 *

.09

-.18

.01

13) # OF COUNTRIES
14) STRATEGY
15) RETURN/SALES

.07

- .06

16) RETURN/ASSETS

.09

.03

.15

.25**

.15

- .15

17) MARKET RETURN

.09

- .15

.04

.03

.01

-. 0 2

p < .05;

.11

p < .01

vo
00

Table 5-6: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1988 (n=67)
1
1)
2

2

3

5

6

SIZE

)

AGE

.31**
- .45***

-.14

3)

GOVERNANCE

4)

RESOURCES

.05

.25*

-.04

5)

STRATEGY

.03

.01

- .35**

)

MR

.24

.15

-.09

7)

AR

.47***

.13

6

4

.20

- .04
.15
.25*

.13
-. 1 0

.02

* p <. 05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

vo
VO

Table 5-7: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1989 (n=77)
1
1)
2

2

3

4

6

SIZE
AGE

)

.17

3)

GOVERNANCE

4)

RESOURCES

.20

.21

- .07

5)

STRATEGY

.05

.12

- .34**

.0 2

)

MR

.19

- .17

.1 0

7)

AR

.32**

- .2 2 *

.39***

6

5

- .45***

-.15

-.39**
.14

* p < .05; ** p < .0 1 ; *** p <

.09
- .08

.001
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Table 5-8: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1990 (n-94)

1

)

SIZE

2

}

AGE

3)

GOVERNANCE

4)

RESOURCES

5)

STRATEGY

)

MR

7)

AR

6

.25**
- .48***

-.16
.20

- .1 0

-. 0 1

.11

- .32***

- .30*

.14

.15

.04

- .19

.13

- .15

.09

.07

.19

.4 4 ***

* p < .05; ** p < .0 1 ; *** p <

- .04

.001
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Table 5-9: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1991 (n=96)

1

)

SIZE

2

)

AGE

.30**

3)

GOVERNANCE

- .49***

4)

RESOURCES

.28*

.24*

- .16

5)

STRATEGY

.01

.14

- .25**

}

MR

7)

AR

6

-.24**
.34***

-.15

- .05

.12

.14

* p < .05; ** p < .0 1 ; *** p <

- .15

- .05
- .05
.1 2

-.11

- .2 1 *

.001
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Table 5-10: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1992 (n=92)
1
1

)

SIZE

2

)

AGE

2

3

4

6

.25**

RESOURCES

.19

.17

-. 1 1

5)

STRATEGY

.07

.18*

- .26**

)

MR

.07

.09

7)

AR

.26**

.15

* p < .05; ** p < .0 1 ; *** p <

•

4)

H

GOVERNANCE

o

-.49***

-.13

3)

6

5

- .2 0 *

-.05
.17

-. 0 2

.18

- .17

.001
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Table 5-11: Effects of the resource stock-governance cost interaction on strategy
1

Year

AGE2

SIZE

GOV

RES

GOV*RES

F

Adj. R*

1988
(n=6 6 )

-.06

- .16

- .40***

-.30**

- .26*

4 .81***

.23

1989
(n=77)

.07

-. 2 1

-.35**

- .25*

- .28**

5.25***

.22

1990
(n=94)

.06

- .26*

- .41***

-.25**

- .15

5.1 2 ***

.18

1991
(n=96)

.1 1

- .2 2 *

- .35***

- .26**

- .2 0 *

5 .35***

.19

1992
(n=92)

.11

- .2 2 *

-.37***

- .25**

- .19*

5.37***

.19

1

Year of independent variables.

2

All coefficients are standardized.

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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and p < .05 in three other years (p - .12 in the remaining
year--1990), initial support was found.

Therefore, sample

firms were placed into groups as described in Chapter 4
(high resource stock and high governance cost versus all
others) and the hypothesis was re-tested with ANCOVA.

For

this analysis, a significant partial F statistic for the
GROUP variable supports the hypothesis.

As Table 5-12

shows, four out of five years are significant at p <

.001

and the fifth year (1988) is significant at p < .10.
cell means are graphed in Figures 5-1 through 5-5.

The
These

show clearly that firms with high governance costs and
high resource stocks use more independent strategies than
other firms.

In sum, hypothesis 1 was supported.

Hypothesis 2

This hypothesis asserted that resource stocks,
governance costs, and strategy should work in conjunction
to influence performance. This hypothesis repeated
formally below:
Hypothesis 2:

There will be a significant three way
interaction effect between resource stocks,
governance costs, and strategy such that;
(a) firms that choose cooperative
strategies when resource stocks are low
regardless of governance costs or when
governance costs are low regardless of
resource stocks,
and;
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Table 5-12: Effects of the high resource-high
governance group on strategy
1968

df

mean square

F1

Model
SIZE
AGE
GROUP1
Error
1969

1

.000

.00

1

.137
.463

1.08
3,64*

1

62
df

7.89
mean square

F

Model
SIZE
AGE
GROUP
Error

1

.021

.18

1

.000

.00

1

1.44

73

8.57

df

1990

mean square

12

.2 2 ***

F

Model
SIZE
AGE
GROUP
Error

1
1
1

90
df

1991

.056
.016
1.49

.49
.14
13 .2 1 ***

10.16
mean square

F

Model
SIZE
AGE
GROUP
Error

1
1
1

92

.050
.067
1.54

.41
.57
13 .0 1 ***

10.88

(table con'd)
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df

1992

mean square

F

Model
SIZE
AGE
GROUP
Error
1

1
1
1
68

.030
.126
1.60

.25
1.06
13.22***

10.65

One-tailed test.

GROUP-all firms with higher than average resource
stocks and higher than average governance costs
versus all other firms.
2

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001.
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(b) firms that choose Independent
strategies only when resource stocks and
governance costs are high;
will perform better in subsequent time
periods than those that do not.
The moderated multiple regression analyses for this
hypothesis were performed twice as discussed in Chapter 4.
First, both dependent variables (MR and AR) were tested
simultaneously in a MMMR model that included control
variables (AGE, SIZE), independent variables (GOV, RES),
all two-way interactions (GOV*RES, STRAT*GOV, STRAT*RES),
and a three-way interaction term (STRAT*RES*GOV). Table
5-13 reports partial Wilks' lambdas and F equivalents for
each variable (except two-way interactions7) and a global
Wilks' lambda for the overall model.

The partial Wilks'

lambda is a measure of the joint effect of each variable
on the dependent variables, given other variables in the
model.

A significant partial Wilks' lambda for the three-

way interaction in Table 5-13 would indicate support for
hypothesis 2 and this is not the case in any study year.
Since the multivariate analysis reduced the sample
size and statistical power considerably, univariate MMR
results for each performance measure are reported in Table
5-14 and 5-15.

Significant three-way interaction terms

7Because coefficients for two-way (control variable)
interactions have no theoretical meaning, they are not
shown.

Table 5-13: Joint effects of governance costs, resource stocks, and strategy interaction
on performance

Year1

AGE

SIZE

STRAT

Three-way2
interaction

GOV

RES

.12
(1.68)

.01
(.07)

.07
(.92)

.65
(1.87)

.64*
(1.78)

.04
(.74)

.01
(.07)

.43
(1.14)

.13
(2.65)

.07
(1.28)

.41
(1.17)

Overall

1988
<n=35)

.053
.13
(,58)4 (1.75)

1989
(n=43)

.05
(.93)

.08
(1.47)

.04
(.70)

.16
(3.12)*

1990
(n=46)

.01
(.16)

.14
(2.84)

.06
(.97)

.06
(1.20)

1991
(n=55)

.02
(.43)

.07
(1.76)

.08
(1.82)

.01
(.11)

.14
(3.67)*

.02
(.41)

.36
(1.20)

1992
(n=67)

.04
(1-00)

.01
(.01)

.07
(2.25)

.13
(4.22)*

.11
(3.48)*

.01
(.10)

.44
(2.12)**

1 Year of independent variables.
2 Two-way control interactions have no theoretical basis and are not reported.
3 (1 - Wilks' lambda), an estimate of the percent of joint variance explained.
4 F equivalent of Wilks' lambda;

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Table 5-14: Effect of governance costs, resource stocks, and strategy interaction on
market returns

Year1

AGE2

SIZE

GOV

RES

STRAT

Three-way3
interaction

F

Adj. R*

1988
(n-36)

-.17

- .24

- .51*

.20

- .25

.29

1.15.

.04

1989
(n=45)

- .26

- .05

+ .26

.16

.17

.24

1.03

.01

1990
(n=40)

.02

- .23

.26

.17

.13

.24

1.16

.03

1991
(n=55)

- .14

- .20

.01

.00

- .15

-.07

.54

1992
(n=68)

- .18

- .02

- .01

.36** -.03

.07

2.38

0
.16*

1 Year of independents variables.
2 All coefficients are standardized.
3 Two-way interactions have no theoretical basis and are not reported.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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Table 5-15: Effect of governance costs, resource stocks, and strategy on accounting
returns

GOV

RES

STRAT

Three-way3
interaction

AGE2

SIZE

1988-89
(n=52)

.07

.28

.07

.39**

.03

.06

3.17**

.27

1989
(n=64)

.09

.12

-.11

.35**

-.10

- .11

3.34**

.25

1990
(n=77)

- .01

.35**

-.05

- .18

- .23

2.63**

.16

1991
(n=81J

- .02

.18

- .23*

.09

- .31**

- .13

5.15***

.32

1992
(n=80)

.01

.02

- .34**

.08

- .34**

.02

4.56***

.29

Year1

- .03

F

Adj . R*

1 Year of independent variables.
2 All coefficients are standardized.
3 Two-way interactions have no theoretical basis and are not reported.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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would indicate support for hypothesis 2 and this is not
the case in any study year.
Sub-group analysis was then performed by taking the
groups created in the sub-group analysis for hypothesis 1
(Figure 3-2) and partitioning each group at its mean
strategy value.
in Figure 3-3.

This created the eight conditions shown
Firms in these eight groups were then

placed into one of two groups (GROUP in Table 5-16)
defined by whether hypothesis 2 showed them as performing
or non-performing conditions (i.e., shaded versus non
shaded cells in Figure 3-3) . Table 5-16 reports partial
Wilks' lambdas and its F equivalents for the independent
variables (i.e., SIZE, AGE, and GROUP).

These measure the

joint effect of each independent variable on the dependent
variables (i.e., AR and MR).

Partial multivariate F

statistics for each independent variable (i.e., SIZE, AGE,
and GROUP) on each dependent variable (i.e., AR and MR)
are also reported.

These measure the univariate effect

(in contrast to joint effects) of each independent
variable on each dependent variable, given all other
variables in the model.

A significant partial Wilks'

lambda (or its F equivalent) for the GROUP variable in
Table 5-16 (MANCOVA) would indicate support for the
interaction's joint effect on the performance measures.
None is significant in any study year.

A significant
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Table 5-16: Joint effects of hypothesized "high" and "low"
predicted performance groups on actual
performance
1988 (n-36)
SIZE
AGE
GROUP
1989 (n*47)
SIZE
AGE
GROUP
1990 (n-49)
SIZE
AGE
GROUP
1991 (n-57)
SIZE
AGE
GROUP
1992 <n-69)
SIZE
AGE
GROUP

AR1

MR2

6.25**
.66
.00
AR

Wilks' 3

.33
.38
1.01
MR

F4

.16
.06
.04

2 .97
.93
.64

Wilks'

F

3 .68
.75
.76

.07
2.15
3.84*

.05
.07
.08

1.00
1.60
1. 98

AR

MR

Wilks'

F

.10
.01
.02

2 .54
.32
.60

Wilks'

F

5.57*
.59
1.12
AR
5.37*
.05
1.84
AR
1.82
.17
.14

1.85
.00
.16
MR
2.76
.36
.76
MR

.10
.01
.04

3 .01*
.22
1.14

Wilks'

F

.03
.05
.02

.99
1.67
.51

.25
2.54
.7

1 Partial F for accounting returns .
2 Partial F for market returns.
3 (1 - Wilks ' lambda), an estimate of joint variance.
4 F equivalent of Wilks' lambda.
5 One-tailed test;

* p < .05
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partial F for GROUP in Table 5-16 would indicate support
for the interaction's effect on a single performance
measure.

Only one out of ten of these is significant {MR

in 1989}.
To insure that these results were not due to low
statistical power, group means for hypothesized high and
low performing groups were plotted for market returns and
accounting returns in Figures 5-6 and 5-7 respectively.
If these non-significant results were due to low
statistical power, a consistent pattern of superior
performance by hypothesized high performers would be
expected--even it the difference was not statistically
significant.

This is clearly not the case.

Thus,

hypothesis 2 is not supported.

Sunmary
This chapter presented the results of tests of the
study's two hypotheses.

Support for these hypotheses

depended on the identification of significant interaction
terms in regression equations and sub-group analysis
(ANCOVA and MANCOVA). The interaction specified in
hypothesis 1 was significant and in a form consistent with
the hypothesis.

Hence, this hypothesis was supported.

Similar interaction terms were not significant for
hypothesis 2.

Thus, this hypothesis was not supported.
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Figure 5-6: Average market returns for hypothesized high
and low performance groups
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reviews the study's results and
discusses the implications of these findings for future
research and practice.

It is organized as follows.

First, the results from hypothesis 1 and 2 are summarized.
Second, the significant findings are discussed along with
their implications for past and future research.

Non

significant findings and their implications for future
inquiry are discussed third.

Fourth, some implications

are drawn for practicing managers.
limitations are presented.

Fifth, the study's

Finally, conclusions are drawn

from the results.
Summary of Results
This study sought to integrate resource and
governance theories of horizontal strategy and link this
synthesis to performance.

Hypothesis 1, which integrated

resource and governance to predict strategy, was
supported.

It stated that firms with low resource stocks

would use cooperative strategies (i.e., joint ventures,
management contracts, and franchising) to access needed
resources, regardless of the governance costs they may
face.

However, if the firm possessed sufficient stocks of

strategically valuable resources, it would select
strategies in accordance with governance theory (i.e.,
independent strategies when governance costs are high and
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cooperative strategies when governance costs are low) .
Hypothesis 2 stated that when firms selected strategy in
conjunction with this synthesis, they would perform
better.

This, however, was not supported.

Discussion of Significant Results
The most important finding of this study is that a
synthesis of resource and governance explains strategy
better than either theory independently.

This finding has

direct implications for: (1) scope literature, (2) other
theories of strategy, (3) prior research, and (4) resource
and governance theory.

These are discussed below.

Implications for scope literature. The study's
clearest contribution is in the context in which the
hypotheses were tested--horizontal scope.

Most prior

research viewed horizontal expansion from a single
theoretical perspective (e.g., Anderson, 1985; Anderson &
Coughlan, 1987; Brickley & Dark, 1907; Lafontaine, 1992) .
The synthesis presented here provides a robust explanation
of how managers choose among alternative horizontal
strategies.

It therefore furnishes a fuller understanding

of the determinants of strategic choice than was available
in prior research.
This understanding then, provides the necessary
groundwork for horizontal scope literature to advance.
First, future inquiry can examine other factors that may
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improve predictive power in models of horizontal strategy.
For example, an organization's environment has been shown
to influence strategic choice (Dess, et al., 1990).

Thus,

adding environmental effects to future investigations may
advance horizontal strategy research by increasing its
predictive power beyond the present study.

Second, since

prior research has been unable to link alternative
horizontal strategies to performance (e.g., Anderson,
1984), these findings may provide the insights needed to
accomplish this objective.

Future inquiry can more easily

present a theory of horizontal strategy performance that
builds on the integrated logic of both theories.

A step

in this direction is attempted in the next section.
Since foreign entry strategies are a form of
horizontal expansion, the literature on foreign entry
strategies may benefit from these results.

This

literature has also relied heavily on resource and
governance theories (e.g., Anderson & Coughlan, 1987;
Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Reid, 1983) to predict strategy.
Because governance costs are inflated by the uncertainty
and complexity of foreign entry (Anderson & Gatignon,
1986}, it would be interesting to see if the resource
stock-governance cost interaction applies in this context.
Such a study may find that only a few core resources are
important enough to usurp governance concerns (cf. Oviatt
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& McDougall, 1994) . If so, then research must identify
what constitutes a "core" resource.

Because these

resources have been described as socially complex and
causally ambiguous {Barney, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982),
"fine-grained"

research methods may be needed to

understand them better (i.e., Eisenhardt, 1989b).

Then,

tools to measure these resources will be needed so that
more traditional methodologies can test important
substantive relationships (Schwab, 1980).
The integration of resource and governance has
implications for research beyond horizontal scope.

The

diversification literature (i.e., industry scope) has
focused almost exclusively on resource relatedness to
predict diversification strategy and performance (Goold &
Luchs, 1993).

Diversification strategy research (i.e.,

acquisition versus direct entry) has shown that firms
prefer direct entry into new businesses when those
businesses' resources are highly related to existing
businesses (e.g., Chatterjee 1990; Yip, 1982).

Since the

relatedness of resources among businesses covaries
strongly with the costs of governing those businesses
(Teece, 1980), the question for future research implied by
this study is whether the quantity of resources interacts
with resource relatedness.

These results suggest that

resource deficient firms use cooperative strategies to
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diversify even in the face of highly related resource
combinations (i.e., low governance costs) while wealthier
firms use cooperative strategies only when businesses are
unrelated (i.e., high governance costs).
In contrast to the diversification literature, the
vertical integration literature has centered on two non
resource based explanations for vertical integration
strategy: (1) governance costs and (2) strategic risks.
The governance cost explanation of vertical integration
argues that integration (i.e., independent strategies)
will occur when the costs of negotiating with and
monitoring external agents is too high.

The strategic

risks explanation for vertical integration predicts that
firms will not integrate (i.e., cooperative strategies) in
the face of environmental dynamism because integration
decreases strategic flexibility (Harrigan, 1963) . An
interesting extension of this study would be to examine
how resource stocks moderate these explanations of
vertical integration.

Contrary to governance theory

predictions, this study's results suggest that high
governance costs firms will not integrate if they cannot
afford to do so (i.e., do not have resources). Likewise,
one might speculate that wealthy firms may still integrate
(i.e., ignore strategic risks) in the face of dynamism to
produce an additional buffer around their core activities
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(cf. Thompson, 1967).

Consequently, in the 1980s we had

silicon valley firms in the dynamic computer industry
outsourcing almost every activity while resource rich IBM
still maintained most functions in-house (Quinn, Doorley,
& Paquette, 1990).
Implications for other theories. The synthesis of
resource and governance can also inform other theories of
organization.

Evolutionary theory (e.g., Levinthal &

Myatt, 1994) attempts to explain how bundles of resources
evolve in different firms over time to shape competition
(Barney & Zajac, 1994).

Because this study found

different strategy-governance profiles at each level of
resource stocks, an evolutionary view would imply that
strategy must change over time as the firm's resources
evolve.

This would suggest the need for longitudinal

research to observe how the pattern of resource evolution
affects strategy.

If such a study found a pattern of

"punctuated equilibrium" (Gersick, 1991), this would have
important implications for research and practice since not
all strategies can flexibly deal with "quantum" changes in
resource availability.

For example, firms that use

independent strategies during stable periods of resource
munificence may find themselves over-exposed to these
strategies after a quantum change to a new, resource
scarce, environment (cf. Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).
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Indeed, resource stocks were a significant predictor of
performance, as measured by accounting returns (Table 515), during the early years of this study (i.e., 1988 &
1989).

However, as the general U.S. economy continued to

slow down in 1990, 1991, and 1992, firms with greater
resources apparently could no longer manage those
resources efficiently.

In those years, governance costs

became paramount to improved accounting returns.
This study may also benefit configurational research.
This body of literature attempts to define sets of firms,
called configurations, with a common profile of
conceptually independent organizational variables (Miller
& Mintzberg, 1984) and relate these to a criterion of
interest (usually performance). Defining the important
dimensions that will help researchers identify "true"
configurations is central to this process (Thomas &
Venkatraman, 1988).

Although resource stocks and strategy

(often defined as scope) have been acknowledged as
important strategic dimensions for defining configurations
(e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1987; Piegenbaum & ThomaB, 1993),
the potential role of governance costs has been ignored.
Since these findings suggest that both resources and
governance are important predictors of strategy, it would
be interesting to see if governance costs can add power to
configurational inquiry.
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Implications for prior research. The results of
hypothesis 1 point to a moderated relationship between
firms' absolute quantity of resource stocks and their
costs of governing external agents.

The presence of an

interaction effect means that main effects are
uninterpretable (Pedhazur, 1962) . Therefore, this result
implies that prior research that considered only one
theoretical perspective (i.e., resource or governance)
need to be reevaluated.
To further clarify, this result demonstrates a
resource stock and governance cost--strategy relationship,
but not a resources stock--strategy and a governance cost-strategy relationship.

The data presented in Table 5-11

and 5-12, and visualized in Figures 5-1 through 5-5 show
that it is only in the high resource-high governance
condition that firms significantly alter their strategy.
Hence, any significant main effects, like the ones for
resource stocks (RES) and governance costs (GOV) in Table
5-11, are simply a statistical artifact of the interaction
(the high resource-high governance condition).

If this

study had investigated resource stocks or governance costs
and their influence on strategy independently, the
positive results would have been uninterpretable because
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an important explanatory variable, the interaction term,
would have been left out of the model.6
If these results generalize to other samples and to
related research questions, then much of the prior
research, which is centered in a single theoretical
perspective, may have uninterpretable results.

For

example, in Eisenhardt's (1965) test of agency theory she
identified a positive relationship between job
programmability and the use of salaries (versus
commissions) in retail sales operations.

It is possible,

however, that her results simply reflect the influence of
a few sample firms with high resources and highly
programmable jobs--in the same way that the influence of
governance costs (including task programmability) in this
study was simply a reflection of the intense use of
independent strategies by those firms with vast resources
and high governance costs.
The example is applicable to resource based research
as well.

For instance, Russo's (1991) investigation of

how cash reserves (a resource) increase the adoption of
the M-form (see: Chandler, 1962) could be re-evaluated in
light of these findings.

If a sub-sample of his utilities

8 When an omitted variable is correlated with an
included variable (as RES*G0V is correlated with RES and
GOV), beta estimates for included variables are biased to
the extent of the correlation (Studenmund & Cassidy, 1987,
p. 121-124).
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with excess cash and unusually high governance costs (also
a determinant of the M-form: Williamson, 1975) were making
the majority of M-form transformations, then his finding
of a main resource effect (i.e., cash) may be inaccurate.
These two examples are not an indication that these
or any other main effects found in prior resource or
governance literature are uninterpretable.

However, until

the original studies are replicated and extended, there is
no way to know.

Therefore, an important implication of

these results is that previously assumed one-way effects
from resources or governance on any criteria of interest
need to be re-investigated by considering the other
theory.

Such research would not only keep future

researchers from building inaccurate models, but would
also help establish boundaries around the resourcegovernance interaction (cf. Bacharach, 1989).
Implication for resource and governance theory.

A

related implication of this study's integration of
resource and governance theories stems from the finding
that resource concerns take precedence over governance.
Because traditional governance arguments broke down under
low resource conditions, one might also expect start-up
ventures, bankruptcy candidates, turnarounds, and
downsizing firms, to ignore governance costs.

In these

low resource contexts, greater emphasis would be placed on
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resource gathering (cooperative) strategies.

In contrast,

this result suggests that firms with significant stocks of
strategically valuable resources (e.g., mature industries
and government protected industries) do pay close
attention to governance costs.

This result can help

future researchers frame studies that recognize the
contextual limitations of each theory.

For example, a

researcher may want to look for an interaction between
governance costs and strategy making processes (cf.
Mintzberg, 1973) on organizational structure.

Given this

study's findings, one might control the influence of
resources by performing such tests with a resource
equivalent sample.
Discussion of Non-significant Results

Strategic management researchers have often pointed
to the centrality of organizational performance for the
field (e.g., Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990).
Therefore, this study attempted to link the interaction
between resource stocks, governance costs, and horizontal
strategy to performance.
supported.

However, this hypothesis was not

There are several explanations.

One

possibility is that strategy does not affect performance.
Population ecologists, for example, would argue that
strategic decisions by managers are not significant
determinants of performance in light of the coercive
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influences of environmental selection (Hannan & Freeman,
1977).

Likewise, strategy may not impact performance

because they are "loosely coupled" (cf. Weick, 1976),
meaning changes in strategy do not necessarily translate
into changes in performance.

However, given the number of

studies linking strategy and performance (see: Capon et
al., [1990] for a meta-analysis), this seems unlikely.
Another possibility is that performance was modeled
incorrectly.

The results of this study (i.e., hypothesis

1) show that the interaction between resource stocks and
governance costs is related to strategy and others have
shown how strategy can affect performance (e.g., Dess &
Davis, 1984; Rumelt, 1974; Snow & Hrebiniak, I960).

Thus,

the interaction between resource stocks and governance
costs may only influence performance through strategy.
Rather than the three-way interaction specified by
hypothesis 2, the relationship may be more accurately
described as moderated mediation (cf. James & Brett,
1984).

In addition to moderated mediation, extant

research supports a direct relationship between a firm's
level of resource stocks and performance (e.g., Haleblian
& Finkelstein, 1993; Robins & Wiersema, 1995).

Hence, the

model in Figure 6-1, which combines moderated mediation
(i.e., RES*G0V-->STRAT-->PERFORM) and a direct resource
stock effect (i.e., RES-->PERF0RM), may provide a more
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Resource
Stocks
^

Strategy

Performance

Governance
Costs

Figure 6-1: A revised model of the effects of resource
stocks, governance costs, and strategy on
performance
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accurate explanation of how resource stocks, governance
costb , and strategy affect performance.
A post hoc analysis was performed to determine the
efficacy of this model.

For both dimensions of

performance (i.e., market [MR] and accounting returns
[AR]), the following two equations were contrasted for
each study year:
(1)

STRAT - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES

(2)

PERFORM - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES, STRAT

Evidence that horizontal strategy mediates the
relationship between the resource stock-governance cost
interaction and performance would be indicated if three
conditions are met: (1) the interaction term in equation l
must be significant (i.e., GOV*RES-->STRAT), (2) the
strategy term in equation 2 must be significant (STRAT->PERFORM), and (3) the interaction term in equation 2 must
be non-significant (GOV*RES-/->PERFORM)

(cf. Venkatraman,

1989).
The first condition of the test for moderated
mediation (GOV*RES-->STRAT) was confirmed by hypothesis 1
(Table 5-11 and 5-12).

Tests of the second condition for

moderated mediation (STRAT-->PERFORM) showed mixed
results.

When market returns (MR) are considered, the

mediation effect depicted in Figure 6-1 is not supported
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(i.e., non-significant in all years).

However, when

accounting returns (AR) are the dependent variable,
the strategy term (STRAT) approaches significance at p ■
.12

in 1990 and becomes significant at p < .01 in 1991 and

1992.

Finally,

the third condition (RES*GOV-/->PERFORM)

was confirmed in all years.

Hence, there is weak evidence

of a mediation effect on this dimension (i.e., efficiency
as measured by accounting returns [AR]) of performance.
The model also specifies a direct resource stock
effect on performance.

A post hoc analysis of this

assertion was examined using the following equations:®
MR - SIZE,

AGE, STRAT, RES

AR - SIZE,

AGE, STRAT, RES.

When market returns are the dependent variable the
resource stock-performance effect is significant in only
one year (1992).

Thus, a direct resource stock effect on

stock market performance is not supported.

When

accounting returns are the dependent variable, the
coefficient for resource stocks is significant at p < .01
in two years (1986 and 1989) and approaches significance
in a third (p * .12 in 1992) . Hence, there is weak
support for a resource stock effect on the efficiency
dimension of performance.

^Because strategy is a predictor of performance in the
model, it must be controlled while testing the resource
stock-performance relationship.
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Although the moderated mediation model presented in
Figure 6-1 must be rejected when performance is measured
by market returns (MR), when accounting returns (AR) are
considered, this analysis furnishes preliminary evidence
that the synthesis of resource and governance theories
presented in this study may have important performance
implications.

Results from hypothesis 1 showed that

managers are using horizontal strategy as a tool to
balance the conflicting influences of resource stocks and
governance costs.

This additional analysis suggests that

the selection of strategy then affects the organization's
efficiency directly.

Thus, one promising avenue for

future research would be to view horizontal strategy as a
mediating variable between its antecedents (resource
stocks and governance costs in this context) and
performance.

Thus far, this approach has been rare in the

strategic management literature (Venkatraman, 1989).
A third possible explanation of the resourcegovernance-strategy to performance relationship is that
their interaction is a necessary, but not sufficient,
precursor to enhanced organizational performance.

When

managers are selecting strategies in accordance with both
resource and governance concerns, it becomes possible to
increase performance.

However, actual performance may co-

depend on other processes within the organization (i.e.,
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site selection, human resource practices, purchasing, and
marketing). Responding to resource and governance
conditions to select strategy may not be enough to
guarantee performance--other factors may need to be
present.

Therefore, future research can benefit by

looking closely at other important variables that may
affect performance.
A final possibility is that the relationship between
resources, governance, and strategy on performance should
be viewed from a configurational perspective.

As noted,

organizational configurations are defined as groups of
firms that covary systematically along several important
dimensions (Miller & Mintzberg, 1984) . This study
investigated the bivariate association between a set of
interactions and performance.

However, bivariate

relationships are often under specified (i.e., omitted
variables) or incorrectly specified (i.e., non-linear)
(Miller, 1981).

Because configurations are made up of

firms with a similar confluence of important
organizational variables, complex, but stable, sets of
inter-relationships can be holistically linked to
performance (e.g., Ketchen, Thomas, Snow, 1993).

Given

that resource stocks, governance costs, and strategy are
only three components of complex organizations, a
configurational approach would appear useful.

For
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example, a configurational study might find configurations
of firms that are alike in terms of resource stocks,
governance costs, horizontal strategy, internal structure,
strategy making processes, and environment.

Members of

some configurations may then be found to perform better
than members of others.
Implications for Practice

The model of horizontal strategy choice presented
here also has implications for practicing managers.
Whether or not managers should select independent
strategies only under high resource-high governance cost
conditions remains to be empirically established.
However, the logic of the model strongly suggests that
firms can optimize long-term effectiveness (through
resource acquisition) and efficiency (through governance
cost minimization) by seeking cooperative strategies under
low resource stock conditions and minimizing governance
costs when resource stocks are sufficient.

Indeed these

results show that many firms are choosing this pattern of
horizontal strategy.

Unless these firms are engaging in

poor performance strategies en masse, there is likely some
value for managers that has, so far, eluded researchers.
At the very least, awareness of these results should
help managers do more accurate competitive analyses.

If

cooperative strategies are useful for garnering resources
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as this theory suggests, then firms with ample resources,
resting at the top of their industry, may be able to
identify potential challengers more quickly by examining
their strategies for growth.

Likewise, firms on the

competitive fringe may be able to identify and react to
competitive threats in their local or regional markets
more quickly by monitoring competitors' strategy.
Limitations
As with all research in the social sciences, this
study suffers from some notable limitations.
Specifically, this study suffers from (1) limited
generalizability, (2) its aggregated measures of resource
stocks and governance costs, and (3) failure to address
potential feedback loops.
Limited generalizabilitv.

This is the only extant

study that investigates the moderating effect of resource
stocks on the governance cost--strategy relationship but
it is confined to a single industry {i.e. food service)
and a single research setting (i.e., horizontal expansion
strategy). However, resource and governance theories have
been applied in several research settings including,* (1)
diversification (e.g., Chatterjee, 1990; Teece, 1980), (2)
upper echelons, (e.g., Boeker & Goodstein, 1993),

(3)

vertical integration (e.g., Williamson, 1975), (4) foreign
entry (Reid, 1981; 1983), and (5) entrepreneurship (e.g.,
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Oviatt & McDougall, 1994).

They have also been tested

with a variety of samples including: (1) retailing (e.g.,
Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988), exporting (e.g., Anderson &
Coughlan, 1987), utilities (e.g., Russo, 1991), and
Fortune 500 firms (e.g., Robins & Wiersema, 1995).

Most

of these studies investigate a research question from a
single perspective (i.e., resource or governance) without
consideration of the other.

Since the existence of a

moderator effect signifies that main effects are
uninterpretable, it is very important that the strength
and boundaries of this relationship are understood.

From

this study, it remains unclear whether the moderation
effect found in the present study and its potential
implications apply in other research settings.

Therefore,

future research can be advanced through a re-evaluation
and extension of some of these original studies by adding
the omitted theory (either resource or governance) to one
way relationships currently offered in the literature.
Construct aggregation. In order to derive a global
measure of the quantity of resource stocks or governance
costs, this study overlooked other features of these
constructs such as quality and type. However, these
features of resource stocks and governance costs can vary
in their influence on strategy.

Resources named in the

literature as potentially valuable (e.g., organization
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culture, secret processes, top management skills, capital
access, R&D skills) differ by context (e.g., industry,
life-cycle stage) as to their importance, ease of
appropriation, and imitability (Barney, 1986; Lippman &
Rumelt, 1982).

Similarly, governance costs are composed

of ex ante negotiation costs and ex post monitoring costs,
bonding costs, and residual (maladaptation) losses (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976; Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1975), and
different strategies have different capacities to counter
these costs (Williamson, 1991) . By using unit weighted
scales to measure the total quantity of resource stocks
and governance costs, this study fails to account for
quality and type differences.

Fortunately, efforts have

begun to understand the differential impact of different
types of resources (e.g., Henderson & Cockburn, 1994).
Feedback loops. The model tested in this study
ignores the possibility of feedback loops.

However,

several viable and potentially confounding feedback loops
do exist.

Starting with the criterion, firms that perform

well can be expected to have increasing financial
resources that permit the firm to invest in additional
stocks of resources such as advertising (i.e., brand name
reputation), research and development, and human capital.
Thus, there is a likely feedback from performance to
resource stocks.

Profitable firms should also be more
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capable using profits to shift toward independent
strategies (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969).

Although this

argument is already embedded indirectly in the model
through the resource stock--strategy link, a direct
performance to strategy feedback was not investigated.
Feedback loops also may flow from strategy.

The

model stated that low resource firms would use cooperative
strategies to access needed resources.

However, accessing

these resources through cooperative strategies would
likely change the firm's level of resource stocks.

For

example, if franchising and joint venturing quickly spread
the firm's brand name reputation, then the firm's stock of
this resource would be increased.
influence resource stocks.

Thus, strategy can

Finally, strategy can, over

time, influence governance costs.

For example, if

cooperative strategies permit the firm to place operations
in more geographically dispersed locations then this
dispersion would decrease the firm's relative cost of
governing external agents (i.e., cooperative partners),
potentially leading to even more cooperative strategies.
Since these potential feedback loops demonstrate that
resource stocks, governance costs, and horizontal strategy
are related in a complex fashion, future research could
benefit by examining the fit of a structural equation
model.

Such a study would provide a deeper and more
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complex understanding of the relationship between these
constructs and help clarify the strength of these feedback
loops.
Conclusions

This study sought to integrate two distinct theories
of the firm--resource theory and governance theory--in the
context of horizontal expansion strategies and link this
synthesis to organizational performance.

Resource theory

argues that firms select strategies to help them access
and control sufficient stocks of strategically valuable
resources (e.g., Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Dierickx &
Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984) . Governance theory suggests
that firm strategy rests upon the economizing of
governance costs (e.g., Coase, 1937; Eisenhardt, 1989a;
Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1991).

Here, it

was proposed that firms with few resources would place the
long-term strategic concern of resource building in front
of short-term efficiency (i.e., governance minimizing)
concerns.

It was also thought that firms that behaved in

this manner would perform better than competitors who
respond differently.
Resource, governance, strategy, and performance data
from 1988-1993 were collected on 101 public food service
chains.

Moderated multiple regression and sub-group

analysis (ANCOVA) confirmed the expected interaction
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between resource stocks and governance costs on strategy.
However, no three-way interaction effect on performance
was detected.
The most important finding of this study is that
resource and governance theories can predict strategy
better than either theory independently in the context of
horizontal scope.

This result should increase

researchers' understanding of the dynamics of strategic
choice along all scope dimensions (i.e., horizontal,
industry, and vertical). Such understanding should play a
useful role in helping future researchers link strategy to
organizational performance
For practicing managers, these results show that
their competitors are likely to respond simultaneously to
resource and governance forces.

At the very least, this

knowledge should enhance the quality of competitive
analyses.

However, greater practical relevance will have

to await further empirical examination of horizontal
strategy's effect on performance.
As with all research, this work suffered from a
number of limitations, including poor statistical power
limited generalizability, heavily aggregated measures, and
unspecified feedback loops.

Nevertheless, the step taken

here to synthesize the resource and governance literatures
is significant.

Until this point, these bodies of
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literature were working in parallel to explain some of the
same phenomena.

However, as this study demonstrates, the

knowledge base in strategic management would be better
served to see these as complementary.
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APPENDIX

Food Service Strategy in the 90's
This survey of selected hospitality experts Is an
important part of a larger study of food service
growth strategies and their impact on firm
profitability

For e a ch question, p le a se circle the number that b e st
indicates your opinion of the food service operation listed
at the top of the p a g e by comparing it to other food service
operations, If you are not familiar with a company, skip
that p a g e.
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Sizzler
Comparing this company to all other food service operations.
...how respected Is this company?

Not Respected
1
2

3

Very Respected
5
6 7

Not Good
...how good ol a value is this company
perceived to provide for tha prica?

1

2

5

Not Strong
... how strong ft this company's reputation tor
oonsMsnt quality and service?

2

Very Strong
6
7

2

Very Strong
6
7

Not Long
1
2

Very Long
6
7

Not Long

Very Long
6
7

1

Not Strong
...how strong is this company's brand name
recognition In Its strvica area?
...how long would It taka to train competent
assistant managers?
...how long would Htake to train competent
hourly employees?

1

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It ve to communicate Job
requirements to unit level managers?

1

Very Difficult
6
7

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would ft be to Include att of the
unit manager’s Job tasks In an operations
manual?

1

Very Difficult
6
7

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would il be to use We
company's kitchen equipment for another food
service format?

1

2

5

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would Kbe to use this
company’s dining room decor for another food
service format?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how dffftcuH would ft be to convert an
average unit's bullcHng and grounds into
another type of business?
...how customized Is the kitchen equipment tor
the company?

Very Good
6 7

1

2

Not Customized
1
2
3

Very Customized
5
6
7
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International House of Pancakes (1-Hop)
Comparing this company toall other food service operations....
.how respected It thia company?
...how good of a valuo It thia company
perceived to provide for the price?
... how strong la thia company’s reputation lor
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company’s brand name
recognition In Ha service area?
...how long would It take to train competent
assistant managers?
...how long would It taka to train competent
hourty employees?
...how difficult would It vs to communicate fob
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the
unit manager’s )ob tasks In an operations
manual?
...how difficult would It be to uee this
company's kitchen equipment for another food
service format?

Not Respected
1
2

3

Not Good
1
2

3

Not Strong
1
2

5

Very Respected
6
7

4

5

very Good
6
7

3

4

5

Very Strong
6
7

Not Strong
1
2

3

4

5

Very Strong
6
7

Not Long
1
2

3

4

5

Very Long
6
7

Not Long
1
2

3

4

5

Very Long
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

3

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

3

4

5

very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to use this
company’s dining room decor for another food
service format?

1

2

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to convert an
average unit’s building and grounds into
another type of business?
...how customized Is the kitchen equipment for
this company?

1

2

Not Customized
1
2
3

Very Customized
5
6
7
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Wendy’s
Comparing this company toall other food service operations..
.how respected is this company?
...how good of a value la this company
paicaivad to provide for tha price?

Not Respected
1
2

3

*

Very Respected
5
6 7

Not Good
1
2

3

4

5

Not Strong
... how strong Is this company's rsputatkm for
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company’s brand name
recognition In Its service area?

2

4

5

Very Strong
6
7

Not Strong
t
2

4

5

Very Strong
6
7

1

Not Long
...how long would It take to train competent
assistant managers?

1

2

Very Long
6
7

2

Very Long
6
7

Not Long
...how long would It take to train competent
hourty employees?

1

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It ve to communicate job
requirements to unit level managers?

1

5

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

Very Customized
5
6
7

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the
unit manager's )ob tasks In an operations
manual?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to use this
company’s kitchen equipment for another food
service format?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would Hbe to use this
company's dining room decor for another food
service format?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it be to convert an
average unit’s building and grounds Into
another type of business?
...how customized is the kitchen equipment for
this company?

Very Good
6 7

1

2

Not Customized
1
2
3

1 66

Pizza Hut
Comparing this company to all other food service operations....
...haw respected is this company?

Not Respected
1
2

3

Very Respected
5
6 7

Not Good
...how good of s value is this company
perceived to provide tor the price?
... how strong is this company’s reputation for
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company's brand name
recognition In its service area?

Very Good

1

5

2

Very Strong
6
7

Not Strong
2

Very Strong
6
7

2

Very Long
6
7

2

Very Long
6
7

1

1

Not Long
...how long would it take to train competent
hourly employees?

1

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It ve to communicate job
requirements to unit level managers?

1

Very Difficult
6
7

2

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the
unit manager's job tasks In an operations
manual?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would Hbe to use this
company’s kitchen equipment for another food
service format?

1

5

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would ft be to use this
company's dining room decor for another food
service format?
...how difficult would it be to convert an
average unit's building and grounds into
another type of business?

f

Not Difficult
1
2

1

2

Very Difficult
6
7

Very Difficult
5

2

5

Not Customized
...how customized is the kitchen equipment for
this company?

7

Not Strong
1
2

Not Long
...how long would It take to train competent
assistant managers?

6

3

6

7

Very Difficult
6
7

Very Customized
5
6
7
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Taco Bell
Comparing this company toall o tter food service operations.
...how respected Is this company?

Not Respected
1
2

4

Very Reapeded
5
6
7

4

5

Very Good
6
7

2

5

Very Strong
6
7

2

5

Very Strong
6
7

5

Very Long
6
7

3

Not Good
...how good of a value la this company
perceived to provide for ths price?

1

2

Not Strong
... how strong is this company's reputation for
conatalant quality and service?

1

Not Strong
...how strong Is this company's brand name
recognition in its service area?

1

Not Long
...how long would it take to train competent
assistant managers?

1

2

4

Not Long
...how long would It take to train competent
hourly employees?

1

Very Long
6
7

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it ve to communicate job
requirements to unit level managers?

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

2

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

Very Customized
5
6
7

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to include all of the
unit manager's job tasks hi an operations
manual?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it be to use this
company's kitchen equipment for another food
service format?
...how difficult would ft be to use this
company's dining room decor for another food
service format?

1

Not Difficult
...how difficult would Hbe to convert an
average unit's building and grounds Into
another type of business?
...how customized le the kitchen equipment for
this company?

1

2

Not Customized
1
2
3
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Nathan’s Famous
Comparing this company to all other food service operations....
...how respected to thto company?

Not Respected
1
2

3

4

Very Respected
5
6
7

4

5

Not Good
...how good of a value to thto company
perceived to provide for the price?

1

2

Not Strong
... how strong to thto company's reputation for
consistent quality and service?
...how strong to thto company's brand name
recognition in Its service area?

2

Very Strong
6
7

Not Strong
1
2

Very Strong
6
7

1

Not Long
...how long would It take to train competent
assistant managers?
...how long would It take to train competent
hourly employees?
...how difficult would It va to communicate fob
requirements to unit level managers?

1

Very Long
6
7

2

Not Long
1
2

4

5

Very Long
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the
unit manager's Job tasks In an operations
manual?
...how difficult would It be to use thto
company's kitchen equipment for another food
service lormat?

1

2

Not Difficult
1
2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to use thto
company's dining room decor for another food
service format?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it be to convert an
average unit's building and grounds Into
another type of business?
...how customized to the kitchen equipment for
thto company?

Very Good
6
7

1

2

Not Customized
1
2
3

Very Customized
5
6
7
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Captain Tony's Pizza
Comparing this company to all other food serviceoperations....
.how respected Is this company?
...how good of a value is this company
perceived to provide for the price?
... how strong is this company’s reputation for
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company's brand name
recognition in Its service area?
...how long would it take to train competent
asaistant managers?
...how long would It take to train competent
hourty employees?

Not Respected
1
2

3

4

5

Vary Respected
6
7

Not Good
1
2

3

4

5

Very Good
6
7

Not Strong
1
2

3

4

5

Very Strong
6
7

Not Strong
1
2

3

4

5

Very Strong
6
7

Not Long
1
2

3

4

5

Very Long
6
7

Not Long
1
2

3

4

5

Very Long
6
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it ve to communicate fob
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would it be to include all of the
unit manager's job tasks in an operations
manual?
...how difficult would it be to use this
company’s kitchen equipment tor another food
service format?
...how difficult would It be to use this
company’s dining room decor for another food
service format?
...how difficult would it be to convert an
average unit’s building and grounds into
another type of buelness?
...how customized is the kitchen equipment for
this company?

1

2

3

Not Difficult
1
2

3

Not Difficult
1
2

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
6
7

3

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

3

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

3

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Customized
1
2
3

4

Very Customized
5
6
7
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Kentucky Fried Chicken
Comparing this company to all other food service operations....
...how respected is this company?

Not Respected
1
2

3

Very Respected
5
6 7

Not Good
...how good of a valuo is this company
perceived to provide for tha pries?

1

2

Not Strong
... how strong is this company's reputation lor
consistent quality and service?

1

1

Very Strong
6
7

2

Very Strong
6
7

2

Very Long
6
7

2

Very Long
6
7

Not Long
...how long would it take to train competent
assistant managers?

1

Not Long
...how long would Ntake to train competent
hourly employees?

1

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it ve to communicate fc>b
requirements to unit level managers?
...how dNficult would H be to include ail of the
unit manager's )ob tasks In an operations
manual?
...how difficult would It be to use this
company’s kitchen equipment for another food
service format?

2

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult

Very Difficull
e
7

1

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would Hbe to use this
company’s dining room decor for another food
service format?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to convert an
average unit's building and grounds Into
another type of business?
...how customized is the kitchen equipment for
this company?

Very Good
6 7

2

Not Strong
...how strong is this compsn/s brand name
recognition in Its service area?

5

1

2

Not Customized
1
2
3

Very Difficult
6
7

Very Difficult
6
7

Very Customized
5
6
7
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Sbarro
Comparing this company to ail other food service operations....
...how respected it this company?

Not Respected
1
2

Very Respected
S
6 7

3

Not Good
...how good of a value Is this company
perceived to provide for the price?
... how strong Is this company’s reputation for
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company's brand name
recognition In Its service area?

1

i

2

Not Strong
t
2

Very Strong
6
7

Not Strong
2

Very Strong
6
7

2

Very Long
6
7

1

Not Long
...how long would It take to train competent
assistant managers?

1

Not Long
...how long would It take to train competent
hourly employees?

1

2

4

5

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It vs to communicate job
requirements to unit leva) managers?
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the
unit manager's job tasks In an operations
manual?
...how difficult would it be to use this
company's kitchen equipment for another food
service format?

...how difficult would it be to convert an
average unit's building and grounds Into
another type of business?
...how customized is the kitchen equipment for
this company?

Very Long
6
7

2

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
1
2

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult

Very Difficult
6
7

1

I

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would It be to use this
company's dining room decor lor another food
service format?

Very Good
6 7

1

2

Not Difficult
t
2

Not Customized
t
2
3

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Very Difficult
6
7

Very Customized
5
6
7
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Bertucci's
Comparing this company to all other food set
...how respected is this company?
...how good of a value is this company
perceived to provide tor the price?
... how strong is this company's reputation tor
consistent quality and service?

S....
Not Respected
1
2

3

4

5

Very Respected
6
7

Not Good
1
2

3

4

5

Very Good
6
7

Not Strong
1
2

Very Strong
6
7

Not Strong
...how strong is this company's brand name
recognition in its service area?
...how long would it take to train competent
assistant managers?

1

4

2

5

Not Long
1
2

Very Long
6
7

Not Long
...how long would It take to train competent
hourly employees?

1

2

4

5

Very Long
6
7

4

5

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it ve to communicate fob
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would It be to include all of the
unit manager's job tasks in an operations
manual?

1

2

Not Difficult
1
2

Very Difficult
6
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it be to use this
company's kitchen equipment for another food
service format?

1

2

5

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
6
7

5

Very Difficult
8
7

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it be to use this
company's dining room decor for another food
service format?

1

2

Not Difficult
...how difficult would it be to convert an
average unit's building and grounds into
another type of business?

1

2

Not Customized
...how customized is the kitchen equipment tor
this company?

1

2

Very Strong
6
7

Very Customized

3

5

6

7
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Is there anything else that you think I should
know about the expert panel or about the firms that
you were asked to rate? If so, please use this
space for that purpose.

Your contribution to this effort is very greatly
appreciated. If you would like a summary of my
results, please print your name and address on the
back of the return envelope. I will see that you
receive it.
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James Gayle Combs was born the son of Donald Gayle
and Judith Kay Combs on August 28, 1963 In Grosse Pointe
Michigan.

He received his Bachelor of Science in Business

Administration with an emphasis in Hospitality Management
in 1986 and his Master of Business Administration in 1990
from the University of Central Florida.

He fulfilled the

requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy in Business
Administration (Management) from Louisiana State
University in 1995.
In addition to published cases and several
Proceedings papers, Jim has published in the Journal of
Small Business Management and the International Journal of
Public Administration. As reflected in this dissertation,
his research interests include resource and governance
based theories of the firm, franchising, and strategic
management of services.

Jim will continue to pursue these

interests as an Assistant Professor in the Department of
Management and Marketing at the University of Mississippi
in Oxford, Mississippi.
Jim plans to marry Melinda R. Whetstone on May 18,
1996 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, at Saint John's United
Methodist Church.
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